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Notes
LIMITING OPERATOR LIABILITY FOR PARENT CORPORATIONS
UNDER CERCIA:
UNITED STATES v. CORDOVA CHEMICAL CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution changed the
United States from an agrarian country to an industrial giant.' The popu-
lation grew dramatically, transportation markedly improved and the fac-
tory became an integral part of the budding national economy.2 One
aspect of industrialization was the rise of the corporation and, with it, lim-
ited corporate liability.3
1. See ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY 198, 513 (8th ed.
1991) (reviewing change in America from "simple, agrarian republic" to "the first
manufacturing nation of the world").
2. See BRINKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 252 (analyzing aspects of economic
change in 1820s and 1830s). Population growth was one characteristic of industri-
alization in America. See id. During the nineteenth century, the population
doubled roughly every 25 years, growing from approximately four million in 1790
to over 31 million by 1860. See id. This growth continued through the industrial
revolution into the twentieth century, with the population reaching more than 76
million people by the turn of the century. See id. at 542. The population of the
United States more than doubled again in the twentieth century and currently is
over a quarter of a billion people. See DONALD WORSTER, THE WEALTH OF NATURE:
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND THE ECOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 6 (1993).
Another characteristic of American industrialization was marked improve-
ments in modes of transportation. See BRINIEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 255-56
(discussing that as result of industrialization, improvements were made in nation's
roads and waterways, increasing travel). Improvements in transportation aided the
development of markets throughout the United States as merchants were able to
transport their goods more conveniently to distant markets. See id. at 256 (analyz-
ing effect of Philadelphia-Pittsburgh turnpike and similar transportation improve-
ments on market development). Improvements in roads and waterways also
accompanied improved means of transportation, including the railroad and the
automobile. See id. at 258, 515-16 (discussing development of railroad and inven-
tion of automobile as indicators of industrial growth); WORSTER, supra, at 7 (find-
ing that automobile "dramatically symbolized the industrial economy").
A final characteristic of industrialization was the rise of the factory as the pre-
dominant method of producing goods and, with it, the development of industrial
technology. See BRINKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 260 (finding that "increasing pop-
ulation, improved transportation, and the expansion of business activity-contrib-
uted to perhaps the most profound economic development in mid-nineteenth-
century America: the rise of factory manufacturing"). With the rise of the factory
came developments in industrial technology, including the invention of electricity,
the development of steel and the use of petroleum. See id. at 514-15.
3. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Liability of Shareholders Under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 136
(1991) (discussing origins of corporations and limited corporate liability). Corpo-
(219)
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The principles of limited corporate liability provide that stockholders
of a corporation, whether individual or corporate, are not personally lia-
ble for the obligations of the corporation. 4 Courts regard the corporation
rations in the United States are "largely a product of developments in the latter
part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries," specifically
industrialization. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUT-
SHELL § 1.4, at 12 (4th ed. 1996). Before that time, the predominant business en-
tity was the unincorporated joint stock company, which primarily conducted local
business. See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2, at 7 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990); HAMILTON, supra,
§ 1.4, at 7 (finding business prior to late nineteenth century tended to be "local in
nature and of primary concern to individual states"). As the country industrial-
ized, however, the corporation gained favor because "it could raise large amounts
of capital from numerous investors and yet provide centralized direction of large
industrial concerns." Id.; see E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in
American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1351, 1354 (1948) (noting that
corporation arose out of "[t]he need for assembling capital for improving inland
transportation facilities, for supplying cities and towns with water, and for carrying
on banking and insurance ... which came to be felt immediately after the close of
the Revolution"). Large amounts of capital and centralized management were
particularly necessary for factory manufacturing, and therefore, as modern ma-
chinery developed and manufacturing moved from the home to the factory, the
"corporate device" also became prevalent. See id. at 1354-55 ("The need to pool
the capital of a number of persons for manufacturing purposes is unlikely to be
felt unless manufacture is to be carried on in a factory."). See generally HENRY WIN-
THROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 9, at 37-41 (rev. ed. 1946)
(discussing history and evolution of state general corporation acts); HARRY G.
HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
§§ 4-12, at 8-19 (1961) (analyzing historical background of corporations).
As corporations developed in the United States, so, eventually, did limited
liability. See Dodd, supra, at 1356 (discussing origins of limited liability). In the
early nineteenth century, many states included a provision in corporate charters
providing for unlimited personal liability for a corporation's shareholders. See id.
at 1352 ("All of the New England states at one time or another adopted a policy of
granting manufacturing corporation charters in large numbers, while coupling the
grants with provisions for unlimited shareholder liability."). By the 1850s, how-
ever, most states provided for limited liability in an effort to encourage incorpora-
tion and investment in their states. See id. at 1368 (discussing "flight-of-capital" as
reason for abandoning unlimited corporate liability); see also Constance S. Chan-
dler & RebeccaJ. Grosser, Comment, An Issue Ripe for Supreme Court Review: Whether
Congress Intended to Alter the Common Law Principles of Corporate Limited Liability When
Enacting CERCLA, 4 Mo. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y REV. 14, 14 (1996) ("The concept of
limited liability was established to insulate corporate owners from the risks associ-
ated with owning a business, thereby, allowing commerce and free enterprise to
flourish."). For the most part, new states adopted limited liability, and by the early
twentieth century, limited liability was the rule in all 50 states. See Ronald G. Aro-
novsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Substance Re-
leases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 421, 430 (1990) (noting that although some
states retained forms of shareholder liability provisions, for most of this century,
limited liability has been general rule).
4. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 25, at 512 (finding that liabilities of
corporation are not same as those of shareholders individually and severally);
HENN, supra note 3, § 146, at 207-09 ("Incorporation for the purpose of achieving
limited liability is recognized in most jurisdictions on the theory that limited liabil-
ity is one of the principle objectives of incorporation."); Chandler & Grosser, supra
note 3, at 14 (discussing limited liability as protecting stockholders from personal
[Vol. 43: p. 219
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as a separate entity, apart from its shareholders, which is protected by a
corporate veil.5 Similarly, courts limit investors' liability for the corpora-
tion's actions to their investment in the company's stock.6 In rare circum-
stances, when a corporation is the sole or majority shareholder of another
corporation and the parent corporation treats the subsidiary corporation
as its "alter ego" or a "mere instrumentality," a court will pierce the corpo-
rate veil and hold the parent corporation liable for the obligations of its
subsidiary.7
In addition to the proliferation of corporations, another consequence
of industrialization was environmental degradation and contamination
from hazardous industrial waste, which was caused by the growing popula-
tion, improvements in transportation and the use of the factory.8 Environ-
liability, unless they participate in liability-creating conduct, either actively or
passively).
5. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 25, at 512 ("It is generally accepted that
the corporation is an entity distinct from the shareholders .... ); HENN, supra
note 3, § 68, at 75 ("For most purposes, the corporation is treated as an entity.");
LyndaJ. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corpo-
rate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 259, 295 (1992) (noting that corporation is
considered separate from its shareholders); Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at
14 ("[A] parent corporation is typically regarded as an entity distinct from its sub-
sidiaries."). One commentator noted that "[a] 'subsidiary corporation' is one
which is controlled by another corporation by reason of the latter's ownership of at
least a majority of the shares of the capital stock. Notwithstanding two corpora-
tions may be so related, each is deemed to have an independent existence."
FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 25, at 513.
6. See WILLIAM W. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAw 19 (1925).
Cook noted:
It is a principle of law, coeval with the existence of corporations having a
capital stock, that, unless the corporate charter or a constitutional statute
provided otherwise, a stockholder, the full par value of whose stock has
been paid in, is not liable for and cannot be made to pay any sums in
addition thereto.
Id.; see Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 431 (noting that shareholder's liability
is limited to investment in corporation); Andrew S. Hogeland & Mary Griffin, Envi-
ronmental Liabilities of Successor and Parent Corporations Under CERCLA, BOSTON B.J.,
Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 6, 6 (discussing traditional limited liability principles in context
of parent corporation CERCLA liability).
7. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 41, at 602-03 ("Practically all authorities
agree that under some circumstances in a particular case the corporation may be
disregarded as an intermediate between the ultimate person or persons or corpo-
ration and the adverse party. .. ."); HENN, supra note 3, § 143, at 205 (noting
general rule is to treat corporation as separate entity, but "when the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons"); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 89, 89 (1985) ("'Piercing' seems to happen freakishly. Like lightening, it is
rare, severe, and unprincipled."); Sung Bae Kim, A Comparison of the Doctrine of
Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and in South Korea, 3 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 73, 74 (1995) (noting that treating subsidiary corporation as "alter ego" or
using it to perpetrate fraud will cause court to pierce corporate veil).
8. See WORSTER, supra note 2, at 6-7 (identifying population growth, improve-
ments in transportation and growth of technology as causes of environmental de-
NOTE
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mental protection and remediation became a national concern in the
1960s and the public awareness of such environmental issues heightened
over the next two decades. 9 In 1980, in response to the growing concern
struction). First, the population growth that began in the industrial revolution has
caused general overpopulation, as well as specific environmental problems. See id.
(noting that average density of United States is 70 persons per square mile, com-
pared with global average of 100 per square mile); see also EVA H. HANKS ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 93 (1974) (describing
environmental aspects of population problem). What has been deemed the popu-
lation problem manifests itself in many forms detrimental to the environment, in-
cluding occupation of open spaces, increased consumption of natural resources,
disproportionate concentrations of people in urban areas and the generation of
more waste. See id.
Second, environmental contamination can also be attributed to improve-
ments in transportation, specifically the invention and proliferation of the automo-
bile. SeeWORSTER, supra note 2, at 7. One commentator noted that "[t]hroughout
America and the rest of the industrial world, the automobile has become the most
common and the most potent technological force for environmental modification
and destruction we have, voraciously consuming wood, aluminum, steel, rubber,
plastic, farmland, city space, wetlands, quiet." Id.
Third and finally, just as the increases in population and improvements in
transportation gave rise to the factory, these factors also contribute to the environ-
mental contamination caused by factories. See SAMUEL S. EPSTEIN ET AL., HAZARD-
OUS WASTE IN AMERICA 6-8 (1982) (discussing "the hazardous waste problem").
Manufacturing goods, such as the automobile, produces by-products, and the
amount of waste generated by factories necessarily increases in relation to the
levels of production, determined in part by population size. See id. at 6 ("Every
process for producing useful things-food, clothing, equipment, drugs, and hous-
ing-also produces materials that are not generally regarded as useful.").
Although most industrial waste is harmless, a small percentage of waste is consid-
ered hazardous. See id. (comparing annoying, but "hardly dangerous," rice straw
with toxic cyanide wastes from gold refining). Commentators have recognized
that "[s] ince hazardous wastes are not useful to the industry producing them, they
have typically been disposed of in the easiest and cheapest way-by dumping them
somewhere convenient." Id. One commentator noted:
Before the era of environmental regulation arrived, untreated toxic
wastes were discharged directly into public waterways, hazardous wastes
were dumped indiscriminately, and all manner of pollutants were spewed
into the air. Such practices have been especially damaging in the United
States, which consumes a huge percentage of the world's resource[s]-
and therefore produces a huge percentage of the world's pollution-rela-
tive to its population.
NEIL STOLOFF, REGULATING THE ENVIRONMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAWS 1 (1991). The problem now is "how to ensure that those who gener-
ate such hazardous wastes do not simply dump them, but handle them in a way
that prevents them from creating public health or environmental problems." EP-
STEIN ET AL., supra, at 7.
9. See BRINKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 985 (discussing "the new environ-
mentalism" and increased public concern over environmental protection). Con-
cern about the environment and preservation efforts date back at least to the late
nineteenth century. See STOLOFF, supra note 8, at 2 (finding "environmental ethic"
present early in nation's history); see also PETERJ. BOWLER, THE NORTON HISTORY
OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 203 (1992) (finding evidence of environmental
conscience in late nineteenth century with creation of Yellowstone as first national
park); BRINKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 985 ("Public concerns about the environ-
ment had arisen intermittently since the beginning of the industrial era .... ).
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/8
1998] NOTE 223
over the environment, specifically the improper disposal of hazardous
During the early twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt aggressively sup-
ported conservation efforts because he was concerned about and dedicated to
preventing "the unregulated exploitation . . . of what remained of the nation's
wilderness." Id. at 644; see STOLOFF, supra note 8, at 2 ("Theodore Roosevelt
equated America's 'natural' resources with its 'national' resources."). During his
presidency, Roosevelt created the National Forest Service and appointed conserva-
tionist Gifford Pinchot as its first director. See BRINKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 645
(noting Pinchot "supported rational and efficient human use of the wilderness").
Also at this time, naturalist John Muir founded the Sierra Club, an organization
"committed to protecting the natural beauty of the land and the health of its wild-
life from human intrusion." Id.
Over the next few decades, environmental activism slowed, but returned with
growing intensity in the 1960s due in part to Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring.
See id. at 985 (discussing Silent Spring and noting that it was one of most controver-
sial books of 1960s, but served to raise awareness about environmental issues); see
also BOWLER, supra, at 504 ("Fear of environmental degradation began in the mid
nineteenth century... but did not become a major concern for most people until
the later decades of the twentieth."). Environmental disasters such as the Love
Canal in New York, the closing of the James River in Virginia because of pesticide
contamination and Valley of the Drums in Kentucky emphasized the severity of the
pollution problem and made it clear that improper disposal of hazardous waste
could have serious consequences, both to the population and the environment.
SeeJay Sandvos, Comment, CERCLA Arranger Liability in the Eighth Circuit: United
States v. TIC Industries, 24 B.C. ENv.L. AFF. L. REv. 863, 867 (1997) (stating that it
became "clear that improper handling and disposal of hazardous substances could
result in substantial adverse effects to both the environment and to human popula-
tions"); see also BOWLER, supra, at 510 ("The twentieth century has seen a massive
increase in the general public's awareness of the damage being done to the envi-
ronment by human activities, and an increasingly militant demand that something
be done to halt the destruction."); EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 37, 67 (noting
that "[a]wareness of the hazardous waste disposal problem . . . dramatically in-
creased" as result of Love Canal and noting that at "'Valley of the Drums,' between
seventeen thousand and one hundred thousand drums of waste were dumped ille-
gally... left to rot, spilling their dangerous contents into a local creek");John M.
Brown, Comment, Parent Corporation's Liability Under CERCLA Section 107 for the En-
vironmental Violations of Their Subsidiaries, 31 TULSA L.J. 819, 819 n.2 (1996) (" 'At
the Valley of the Drums [located in Kentucky], thousands of barrels were stacked
illegally in the hauler's backyard ... in a seriously deteriorating state .... [S]ome
have already burst and spilled their contents on the ground."' (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 18-19 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6121)). Congress responded to these and other environmental
problems in the 1970s by enacting legislation that recognized the need to preserve
the environment and by creating the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). See
STOLOFF, supra note 8, at i, 1 (noting that environmental disasters created "ecologi-
cal imperative," to which Congress responded with "far-reaching laws" and crea-
tion of EPA and stating that "[i]n the 1970s, the freedom of industry to pollute
free of charge came to an end"); LETrIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE
IN COURT 1 (1982) (noting congressional finding for National Environmental Pol-
icy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994), enacted in 1970, was that "'[t]he Congress
recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each
person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of
the environment."' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1994))); see also CHARLES T.
RUBIN, THE GREEN CRUSADE: RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 6
(1994) (noting that environmental awareness increased in public mind as well as
in political consciousness).
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waste and its disastrous effects on the environment, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) .10
Congress enacted CERCLA "'to address the increasing environmental
and health problems associated with inactive hazardous waste sites."' 1 1 It
is a remedial statute that provides for a strict, joint and several liability
scheme.1 2 When a release of hazardous substances requires the expendi-
ture of funds in response, any person that qualifies as a responsible party is
liable for the costs to remove the hazardous substances or remediate the
site and any other necessary costs and damages for injury to or loss of
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). CERCLA was enacted in the closing days
of the lame-duck term of the 96th Congress. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3,
at 421 (noting that CERCLA was "a hurried measure to address the emerging
problem associated with the cost of cleaning up the nation's hundreds of leaking
hazardous waste disposal sites"); Sandvos, supra note 9, at 868. Although there is
extensive legislative history on earlier versions of the bill in each house, the actual
statute has little legislative discussion as it was "the rushed product of last-minute
compromises." Id.; see ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INST., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY xiii (Helen Cohn Needham & Mark Menefee eds., 1982) (noting that "last-
minute compromise hampers the ability of researchers to draw definitive conclu-
sions from the otherwise extensive legislative history of CERCLA," but nevertheless
shows congressional concerns that resulted in CERCLA's enactment); see also New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The version
passed by both Houses ... was an eleventh hour compromise put together primar-
ily by Senate leaders and sponsors of the earlier Senate version."). One court
noted:
CERCLA was enacted on December 11, 1980 in the last days of the 96th
Congress. The final version of the Act was conceived by an ad hoc com-
mittee of Senators who fashioned a last minute compromise which ena-
bled the Act to pass. As a result, the statute was hastily and inadequately
drafted. The only legislative history on the compromise is found in the
floor debates.
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (cit-
ing 126 CONG. REc. 30,930-87 (1980); 126 CONG. REc. 31,964-82 (1980)). Never-
theless, the legislative history that is available is a useful guide to Congress'
intentions in enacting CERCLA, as it contains many provisions that appeared in or
closely resembled earlier versions of the bill in both houses. See Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1040 (noting one sponsor's claim that "the version passed 'embodie[d]
those features of the Senate and House bills where there has been positive consen-
sus' while 'eliminat[ing] those provisions which were controversial'" (quoting 126
CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph))).
11. Brown, supra note 9, at 819 (quoting Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1992)); see Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3,
at 422 ("The leading objective of CERCLA is decisive action to begin the process of
remediating the nation's leaking hazardous waste sites."); Heidt, supra note 3, at
149-50 ("Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to clean up and otherwise protect the
public from sites contaminated with hazardous substances and to provide a fund to
support cleanup and related measures.").
12. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 425 ("CERCLA was intended pre-
sumptively to impose strict, joint and several liability on responsible parties as de-
fined in section 107(a) of the statute."); Heidt, supra note 3, at 153 ("[CERCLA]
[1]iability is strict liability .... ); Sandvos, supra note 9, at 869 ("[C]ourts consist-
ently have interpreted CERCLA as creating strict, joint, and several liability.").
[Vol. 43: p. 219
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natural resources.1 3 Responsible parties under CERCLA include the pres-
ent "owner and operator" of a facility, the past "owner or operator," any-
one who arranges for disposal of hazardous substances and any person
who accepts such waste for transport.
14
Congress enacted CERCLA to provide a mechanism for the cleanup
of hazardous substances and to impose financial responsibility on private
responsible parties as opposed to the taxpayers. 15 When an immediately
responsible corporation is incapable of paying its share of cleanup costs,
imposing financial responsibility on that company's owner, such as hold-
ing a parent corporation liable for the environmental wrongs of its subsidi-
ary, furthers CERCLA's goals. 16 This broad liability scheme, however,
seems to be at odds with the fundamental principle of limited liability for
parent corporations, and the statute does not expressly resolve this con-
flict.1 7 Therefore, in cases involving parent corporation liability for the
environmental actions of its subsidiary, courts are left to interpret the ap-
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) (defining persons liable under CERCLA);
see also Theodore L. Garrett, Superfund Liability and Defenses: A 1992 Primer, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 3, 3-4 (describing basic liability provisions of
CERCLA).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1)-(4) (defining potentially responsible parties
under CERCLA).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3038 (discussing provisions within statute which ensure both that contami-
nated sites will be cleaned up and responsible parties will pay); 126 CONG. REC.
30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (stating liability scheme under statute
"assures that the costs of chemical poison releases are borne by those responsible
for the releases"); Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 422-23 ("One of the funda-
mental policies underlying CERCLA is to accomplish... [the] goal [of remediat-
ing hazardous waste sites], to the maximum extent possible, at the expense of
private responsible parties rather than the taxpayers."); Chandler & Grosser, supra
note 3, at 14 ("The statute aims to achieve prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites
by placing the ultimate financial responsibility for cleanup on those responsible
for the pollution.").
16. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 422-23 (noting that holding parent
corporation liable when responsible subsidiary is unable to pay amount it owes
accomplishes fundamental policy of CERCLA to remediate hazardous waste sites at
expense of private responsible parties).
17. See Sandvos, supra note 9, at 864 ("One fundamental problem of CERCLA
interpretation is how to harmonize CERCLA's broad scheme of strict, joint, and
several liability with the primary canons of torts and corporations law on which the
statute overlays."); see also Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 423 (finding that
imposing liability on parent corporations furthers CERCLA's goals, but "[o]n its
face, . . .this approach violates a fundamental principle of the law of corpora-
tions-that shareholders, be they individual or corporate, are liable for no more
than the amount of their investment in the corporation"). Although Congress
expressly intended to hold responsible parties financially liable for remediation of
hazardous waste sites, the statute and legislative history are silent as to the interac-
tion of this liability scheme and the liability scheme for parent corporations. See
Brown, supra note 9, at 820 ("[I]t is unclear whether parent corporations can be
held liable as potentially responsible parties for the acts of their subsidiary corpora-
tions because CERCLA never expressly refers to parent or subsidiary
corporations.").
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propriate liability standard.18
It was in this context that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Cordova Chemical Co.19 and adhered to
the traditional corporation law doctrine of limited liability by adopting a
veil piercing test for parent corporation liability under CERCIA.20 This
Note suggests that, to the contrary, parent corporations should be directly
liable for the actions of their subsidiaries if the parent's conduct consti-
tutes actual control over its subsidiary.2 1 This broad interpretation of op-
erator liability is in accord with the statutory language of CERCLA and
congressional intent.2 2 Part II of this Note discusses CERCLA liability in
general, as well as the three judicially created standards for holding a par-
ent corporation liable as an operator. 23 Part III examines the Sixth Cir-
cuit's en banc decision in Cordova Chemical, in which the court adopted a
"piercing the corporate veil" standard for holding a parent corporation
liable as an operator for the activities of its subsidiary.24 Part IV advocates
that the Sixth Circuit erred in adopting an indirect liability standard and,
instead, should have followed the majority of circuits and adopted a direct
liability standard, imposing operator liability on a parent company when it
exercises pervasive control over its subsidiary. 25 Finally, Part V of this Note
concludes by discussing the probable impact of the Sixth Circuit's
decision.26
18. See Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 14 ("When considering the liabil-
ity of parent corporations for the environmental torts of their subsidiaries, the
issue is often whether the applicable standard of liability derives from direct appli-
cation of the statutory definitions of CERCLA or from common law principles of
corporate law."); see also Hogeland & Griffin, supra note 6, at 6 ("IJ]udicial deci-
sions continue to define the point at which the environmental liabilities of the
owner or operator of a site contaminated by hazardous waste may be imposed on
successor or parent companies.").
19. 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997).
20. Id. at 580 (holding "that where a parent corporation is sought to be held
liable as an operator... based upon the extent of its control of its subsidiary which
owns the facility, the parent will be liable only when the requirements necessary to
pierce the corporate veil are met").
21. For a discussion of actual control as the standard adopted by numerous
circuit courts, see infra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the statutory language of CERCLA, as well as Congress'
intent in enacting the statute, see infra notes 182-229 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the basic statutory provisions of CERCLA, as well as the
three recognized standards for parent corporation operator liability, see infra
notes 27-49, 63-109 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., see infra notes 110-60 and
accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of how the Sixth Circuit erred in adopting a piercing the
corporate veil test and why it should have adopted the actual control standard, see
infra notes 161-264 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the impact of Cordova Chemical, see infra notes 265-71
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43: p. 219
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II. BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 "in an effort to address perceived
inadequacies of earlier environmental legislation. '27 Congress recognized
27. Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 14; see New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) ("CERCLA was designed 'to bring order
to the array of partly redundant, partly inadequate federal hazardous substances
cleanup and compensation laws.'" (quoting FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENvi-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAw AND POLICY 568 (1984))); Oswald & Schipani, supra
note 5, at 264 (noting that Congress enacted CERCLA to remedy prospective out-
look problem of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (1994)). Before 1980, RCRA was the primary source of hazardous
waste legislation. See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 5, at 264 (noting that before
1980, RCRA "had been the primary statute governing hazardous wastes"). The
biggest shortcoming of RCRA, according to Congress, was its entirely "prospective
outlook," addressing current and future hazardous waste disposal issues, but offer-
ing no remedy for previously contaminated sites. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at
22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125 (including as deficiency of
RCRA that "[t]he Act is prospective and applies to past sites only to the extent that
they are posing an imminent hazard," and concluding that even in those situa-
tions, "the Act is of no help if a financially responsible owner of the site cannot be
located").
CERCLA improves upon RCRA and other earlier environmental legislation in
three ways. See Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 15. First, the President has the
authority to seek an injunction to force a responsible party to clean up a hazardous
waste site or spill that poses "'an imminent and substantial danger to the public
health or welfare.'" Oswald & Schipani, supra note 5, at 265 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604 (a) (1) (1994)). Section 9604 of CERCLA provides:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a sub-
stantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a
release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollu-
tant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial dan-
ger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act,
consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for
the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazard-
ous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its re-
moval from any contaminated natural resource), or take any other
response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which
the President deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or
the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1). The President delegated this power to the EPA by author-
izing it to order responsible parties to remediate contaminated facilities. See Os-
wald & Schipani, supra note 5, at 265 n.24 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R.
§ 168 (1982), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,418, 3 C.F.R. § 187 (1983)).
Second, CERCLA improves upon previous environmental legislation by im-
posing strict, joint and several liability, ensuring that responsible parties will be
financially liable for cleanup costs. See id. at 265 n.27 (noting remarks of CERCLA
sponsor, Representative James Florio). Representative Florio stated that "a strong
liability scheme will insure that those responsible for releases of hazardous sub-
stances will be held strictly liable for costs of response and damages to natural
resources." 126 CONG. REC. 31,964 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio).
Third and finally, Congress ensured remediation of past, present and future
contaminated sites by creating the "Superfund," a "trust fund used by the EPA to
cover the expenses associated with the immediate cleanup of hazardous substances
before contribution by the responsible parties who are unable to pay the costs of
9
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two fundamental goals in enacting CERCLA: "(1) to provide for cleanup
if a hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such release
is threatened, and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of
these cleanups."
28
cleanup or cannot be found." Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 15; see S. REP.
No. 96-848, at 13 (1980) (noting Superfund is "a fund to finance response action
where a liable party does not clean up, cannot be found, or cannot pay the costs of
cleanup and compensation"); see also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1041 (noting that
"EPA can use Superfund resources to clean up hazardous waste sites and spills"
while, at same time, "sue for reimbursement of cleanup costs from any responsible
parties it can locate .... allowing the federal government to respond immediately
while later trying to shift financial responsibility to others").
Congress appropriated over $1.6 billion for the Superfund in 1980 for five
years, $8.5 billion more when Congress amended the statute in 1986 for the five-
year period beginning on October 17, 1986, and not more than $5.1 billion for the
period from October 1, 1991 to September 30, 1994. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)
(1994) (defining uses of fund). The President, acting through the EPA, is author-
ized to use the fund for purposes such as (1) assessing short- and long-term injury
to, destruction or loss of natural resources caused by a hazardous substance re-
lease; (2) funding efforts to restore, rehabilitate or replace any natural resources
injured by a release; (3) funding programs to identify, investigate and prevent haz-
ardous substance releases; (4) undertaking studies as to the long-term effects of
releases; and (5) developing safety measures for employees responding to hazard-
ous substance releases, among others. See id. § 9611(c)(1)-(14). Use of the
Superfund, however, is subject to certain enumerated limitations. See id.
§ 9611(d)(1)-(2). For example, the fund cannot be used to compensate parties
injured by releases when all of the damage occurred entirely before December 11,
1980, and cannot be used to pay claims when the injuries resulted from long-term
exposure to ambient air pollutants from multiple sources. See id.
28. H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3038; see Richard B. Stewart & Bradley M. Campbell, Lessons from Parent Lia-
bility Under CERCI.A, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 7, 7 ("The rationale
typically associated with CERCLA is that it 'both provides a mechanism for clean-
ing up hazardous waste sites . . . and imposes the costs of the cleanup on those
responsible for the contamination."' (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 6 (1989))); see also Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 14 (recognizing
that CERCLA "aims to achieve prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by placing
the ultimate financial responsibility for cleanup on those responsible for the pollu-
tion"); Tricia R. Russo, Note, FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Com-
merce: An Overexpansion of "Operator" Liability Under CERCLA, 7 VILL. ENVrL. L.J.
157, 157 (1996) (stating that "[c]leanup of hazardous waste sites is [CERCLA's]
top priority"); Sandvos, supra note 9, at 868 (noting that Congress tried to achieve
these two general goals in CERCLA); William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of
Parent or Successor Corporation, or Corporate Shareholders, in Action Pursuant to Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S. C.A.
§§ 9601-9675), 121 A.L.R. FED. 173, 185 (1994) (noting Congress' goals in enacting
CERCLA). CERCLA's rationale "equates the CERCLA liability scheme with the
traditional purposes of tort liability-compensation, deterrence, and a broader ef-
ficiency rationale of placing 'ultimate responsibility for cleanup on those responsi-
ble for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons."' Stewart &
Campbell, supra, at 7 (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)). The House Report on its version of
CERCLA described the goals of the bill as
an inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites in a systematic manner, es-
tablishment of priorities among the sites based on relative danger, a re-
sponse program to contain dangerous releases from inactive hazardous
10
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CERCLA is a remedial statute in that Congress enacted it to provide a
remedy and to improve upon earlier statutory remedies for hazardous
waste disposal and contamination problems. 29 As a general principle of
statutory construction, courts should liberally construe remedial statutes
to effectuate Congress' purpose in enacting them.30 Accordingly, courts
waste sites, acceleration of the elimination of unsafe hazardous waste
sites, and a systematic program of funding to identify, evaluate and take
responsive actions at inactive hazardous waste sites to assure protection of
public health and the environment in a cost-effective manner.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 25.
29. See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.02,
at 152-55 (5th ed. 1992) (describing characteristics of remedial statutes). Reme-
dial statutes "provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing
for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries." Id. The category of
remedial statutes also includes those statutes "made from time to time to supply
defects in the existing law, whether arising from the inevitable imperfection of
human legislation, from change of circumstances, from mistake, or any other
cause." G.A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES § 107,
at 142 (1888); see HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 489 (2d ed. 1911) (noting general definition of re-
medial statute is one "which gives a remedy or means of redress where none ex-
isted before, or which creates a right of action in an individual, or a particular class
of individuals"); see 3 SINGER, supra, § 60.02, at 152 (defining remedial statutes as
those "intended for the correction of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil
institutions and the administration of the state"). Finally, commentators define
remedial statutes as those that "relate[ ] to practice, procedure, or remedies and
do[ ] not affect substantive or vested rights." Id. CERCLA is properly character-
ized as remedial under the first two definitions because Congress enacted it both
to provide a remedy for environmental contamination and to improve upon reme-
dies provided by RCRA. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 22 (discussing deficiencies of
RCRA and stating intent to "establish a comprehensive response and financing
mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites").
30. See ENDLICH, supra note 29, § 107, at 142 (stating that remedial statutes
"are to be construed liberally, to carry out the purpose of the enactment, suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy contemplated by the Legislature"); 3 SINGER,
supra note 29, § 60.01, at 147 ("The policy that a remedial statute should be liber-
ally construed in order to effectuate the remedial purpose for which it was enacted
is firmly established."). A liberal construction is essentially "'giving the words [of
the statute] the largest, the fullest, and most extensive meaning of which they are
susceptible.'" ENDLICH, supra note 29, § 107, at 147. Because remedial statutes are
enacted to cure a deficiency in a previous law, to fill in a blank, to enforce a right
or remedy a wrong, "it is but reasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended
to do so as effectually, broadly and completely, as the language used, when under-
stood in its most extensive signification, would indicate." Id.; see 3 SINGER supra
note 29, § 60.01, at 147 ("A liberal construction is ordinarily one which makes the
statutory rule or principle apply to more things or in more situations than would
be the case under a strict construction."). Sometimes interpretation of remedial
statutes can extend beyond the actual language of the statute. See ENDLICH, supra
note 29, § 110, at 144 (noting that in some cases, to effectuate purpose, interpreta-
tion is extended beyond letter of law). This typically happens when limiting the
interpretation to the act's language would impede statutory intent. See id. (stating
that construction of statute will be extended "to prevent a failure of justice, and
consequently of the probable intention"). There are, however, limits placed on
courts in interpreting remedial statutes. See id. First, as a general rule, "[a] court
11
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interpret CERCLA liberally to effectuate its goals.3 1
CERCLA also provides for strict liability, although there is no such
express statement in the statute.32 Instead, the statute provides that courts
should construe "liability" as "the standard of liability" under § 1321 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 which courts have held to impose strict liability. 34 Ac-
cannot go beyond reasonable bounds in applying the liberal construction in order
to stay within the prerogatives of the legislature." 3 SINGER, supra note 29, § 60.01,
at 147. Second, an interpretation cannot be extended beyond the words of a re-
medial statute "where the words are too explicit to admit of belief that such exten-
sion was intended." ENDLICH, supra note 29, § 110, at 146.
31. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d
1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that CERCLA is construed liberally to achieve
goals of statute); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1317 (11th Cir. 1990) ("At the outset, we note that a liberal judicial interpretation
... is required in order that we achieve CERCLA's 'overwhelmingly remedial' stat-
utory scheme."); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380
(8th Cir. 1989) (stating that "courts have concluded that a liberal judicial interpre-
tation is consistent with CERCLA's" liability scheme); United States v. Northeast-
ern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding statutory
scheme to be remedial and retroactive); see also Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3,
at 23 ("CERCIA was enacted to remediate the existence of extensive environmen-
tal contamination; and to protect and preserve the public health and the environ-
ment."); Russo, supra note 28, at 157 (noting that because courts consider
CERCLA remedial statute, they construe it liberally).
32. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 ("Congress intended that responsible
parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability
was not included in the compromise.").
33. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (32) (1994); see Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 (noting that
courts held liability under Clean Water Act to be strict and Congress understood it
to impose such liability). The legislative history of CERCLA indicates that Con-
gress intended it to impose strict liability. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (state-
ment of Sen. Randolph) (stating that, although many concessions were made in
compromise bill, "[w]e have kept strict liability in the compromise, specifying the
standard of liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act"); H.R. REP. No. 99-
253, pt. 3, at 15 ("Liability for the cost of cleanups under CERCLA is 'strict, joint
and several.'"). Both the House and the Senate versions of CERCLA originally
provided for strict liability. See S. 1480, 96th Cong. § 4(a) (1980); H.R. 7020, 96th
Cong. § 3071 (a)(1) (1980). House Bill 7020 provided that except for certain enu-
merated defenses, "where any release, or threatened release, of hazardous waste
into the environment from or at an inactive [hazardous waste] site causes any costs
described in subsection (b), any person who caused or contributed to the release
or threatened release shall be strictly liable for such costs." Id. The Senate's ver-
sion stated that except when a person otherwise liable could prove a defense, those
people who own, operate, arrange for disposal at or transport materials to a facility
"from which a hazardous substance is discharged, released, or disposed of... shall
be jointly, severally and strictly liable" for remediation costs. S. 1480, § 4(a). A
compromise version of the bill, however, deleted express language of strict liabil-
ity. See 126 CONG. REC. 31,964 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) (recognizing that
compromise bill does not expressly state strict liability as standard anymore). One
explanation for the deletion was "to avoid confusion over new language." Id. at
30,986 (statement of Sen. Stafford). Drafters found using the term "strict liability"
would result in confusion with "various common law and statutory doctrines of
'strict,' 'no fault' or product liability." Id. (statement of Sen. Simpson). By refer-
ring to section 311 of the Clean Water Act, drafters hoped to unambiguously state
12
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cordingly, courts interpret CERCLA as a strict liability statute and hold
parties responsible without regard for fault or culpability.3 5 In addition,
when the harm caused is indivisible, CERCLA liability is joint and
several.
36
the intended liability standard, which was strict liability. See id. at 31,964 (state-
ment of Rep. Florio). CERCLA's sponsor in the House of Representatives, Repre-
sentative Florio, stated:
The liability provisions of this bill do not refer to the terms strict, joint
and several liability .... The standard of liability in these amendments
[referring to amendments made to bill by Senate] is intended to be the
same as that provided in section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act; that is, strict liability. I have reviewed carefully the statutory lan-
guage, the floor statements from the Senate, and the language and
precedents under section 311 of the Clean Water Act. I have concluded
that despite the absence of these specific terms, the strict liability stan-
dard already approved by this body is preserved.
Id. at 31,965. The Department of Justice (DOJ) concurred in the understanding
that Congress intended CERCLA liability to be strict. See id. at 31,966. In a letter
to Representative Florio, the DOJ stated liability under the Clean Water Act was
"one of strict liability. Both the Senate passed 'Superfund' legislation and section
311 provide for liability subject to certain specifically enumerated defenses.
Neither provision allows for a defense based on the defendant's non-negligent
conduct or exercise of due care." Id. (statement of Rep. Florio).
The proponents of the bill in the Senate also agreed that liability under CER-
CLA was strict. See id. at 30,932 (statement of Sen. Randolph). The bill's sponsor
in the Senate, Senator Jennings Randolph, said that the same standard of liability
under section 311 was applicable to CERCLA and that he understood "this to be a
standard of strict liability .... As under section 311, due care or the absence of
negligence with respect to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
does not constitute a defense under this act." Id. (statement of Sen. Randolph).
The strict liability standard of section 311 was widely recognized in the Senate. See
id. at 30,950 (statement of Sen. Dole) ("It also makes sense to incorporate a defini-
tion of strict liability that will serve as a uniform standard in determining liability
for cleanup and other costs, and this has been achieved by reference to the Clean
Water Act."); id. at 30,952 (statement of Sen. Culver) ("[The committee bill]
makes those who release hazardous substances strictly liable for cleanup costs, miti-
gation and third-party damages. Thus, it assures that the costs of chemical poison
releases are borne by those responsible for the releases.").
35. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1990)
(noting that "[u]nder this strict liability statute," plaintiff must only prove that de-
fendant was among potentially liable parties); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We agree with the overwhelming body of prece-
dent that has interpreted section 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme.");
Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding CERCLA imposes strict liability); Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader
Capital, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 410, 412 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (recognizing that CERCLA
"imposes strict liability for the costs associated with responding to the release or
threatened release of the hazardous substance"); see also Sandvos, supra note 9, at
869 ("Although CERCLA does not state explicitly a scheme of liability, courts con-
sistently have interpreted CERCLA as creating strict, joint, and several liability.").
36. See United States v. Arrowhead Refining Co., No. CIV.A-S-89-202, 1993 WL
170966, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 12, 1993) ("The statute imposes joint and several
strict liability for harm which is not divisible between multiple actors."). Like strict
liability, joint and several liability is not expressly stated in the statute, but courts
have interpreted CERCLA to impose such a standard. See 126 CONG. REc. 31,965
(statement of Rep. Florio). Earlier versions of the statute included language pro-
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To mitigate some of the harshness of CERCLA's strict, joint and sev-
eral liability scheme, the statute includes defenses, but their availability is
limited.37 An otherwise liable party is not liable when the release of haz-
ardous substances was entirely caused by an "act of God," an "act of war"
or a third party with no relationship to the defendant if the defendant can
prove that it took adequate precautions and used reasonable care to avoid
the release.3 8 Congress also added an "innocent purchaser" defense in
viding for joint and several liability when the harm caused was indivisible. See S.
1480 § 4(a) (stating that except for certain defenses, potentially responsible parties
"shall be jointly, severally and strictly liable" for remediation costs); H.R. 7020,
§ 3071 (a) (1) (D) (stating that liability "shall be joint and several with any other
person who caused or contributed to such release"). As part of the compromise
version, Congress deleted the joint and several liability language "with the intent
that the liability of joint tortfeasors be determined under common or previous
statutory law." 126 CONG. Rjc. 31,965 (statement of Rep. Florio). Some inter-
preted the deletion of the joint and several liability language as requiring a link
between culpable conduct and financial responsibility. See id. at 30,972 (statement
of Sen. Helms) (opining that drafters "have recognized [the] unfairness, and the
lack of wisdom in eliminating any meaningful link between culpable conduct and
financial responsibility"). Senator Helms found that because courts did not inter-
pret section 311 of the Clean Water Act as imposing joint and several liability,
CERCLA would also not include such provisions, limiting the government to suing
a defendant "only for those costs and damages that it can prove were caused by the
defendant's conduct." Id. (statement of Sen. Helms). The DOJ, in a letter to Rep-
resentative Florio, discussed the Senate's version of CERCLA noting that they de-
leted the reference to joint and several liability, but that it was clear "that this
deletion does not in any way preclude courts from imposing joint and several lia-
bility where appropriate. This conclusion is fully supported by both the bill itself
and its legislative history." Id. at 31,966 (statement of Rep. Florio). Applying com-
mon law principles, courts consistently hold that when the environmental harm is
indivisible, the parties will be jointly and severally liable. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v.
Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Where the environmental harm is
indivisible liability is joint and several."); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at. 171 ("While CER-
CLA does not mandate the imposition ofjoint and several liability, it permits it in
cases of indivisible harm."); see also 126 CONG. Ric. 31,965 (statement of Rep.
Florio) (noting that Coast Guard, which is government body responsible for ad-
ministering section 311 of Clean Water Act, has interpreted liability to be joint and
several in appropriate circumstances); Mark F. Rosenberg, Parent, Successor, and
Alter Ego Liability Concerns in the Transactional Setting, A.B.A. BRIEF, Summer 1996, at
29, 29 ("Courts have ruled that liability under CERCLA is retroactive and that re-
sponsible parties are jointly and severally liable for all cleanup costs at a contami-
nated site where the harm is indivisible.").
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994). Although the statute includes these de-
fenses, courts interpret them very narrowly, limiting their successful use by liti-
gants. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
("With CERCLA's basic remedial purposes in mind, the Court narrowly construes
the defenses provided under section 107(b)."); see also Brian C. Walsh, Seeding the
Brownfields: A Proposed Statute Limiting Environmental Liability for Prospective Purchas-
ers, 34 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 191, 195-96 (1997) (noting that use of defenses is limited
because of narrow judicial interpretation).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(4). Section 9607(b) states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a per-
son otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-(1) an act of
[Vol. 43: p. 219
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/8
1998] NOTE 233
the 1986 amendments to CERCLA.
39
God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party other than
an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omis-
sion occurs in connection with a contractual relationship [42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35) (1994)], existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant
(except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published
tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned,
taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance,
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precau-
tions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions;
or (4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id. Although CERCLA provides three defenses, defendants rarely rely on the first
two. See Garrett, supra note 13, at 6. Defendants use the act of God defense spar-
ingly because courts interpret it very narrowly. SeeWalsh, supra note 37, at 195. An
act of God is defined as "an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of
which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or
foresight." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (1994). The United States District Court for the
Central District of California refused to find that heavy rainfall fit within this defi-
nition in United States v. Stringellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal.. 1987). The court
reasoned that "rains [a]re not the type of 'exceptional' natural phenomena to
which the narrow act of God defense ... applies," that they were foreseeable and
that they were not the sole cause of release. Id. at 1061. Another reason that
defendants rarely use the defense is that it is very difficult to prove that an act of
God was the sole cause of the release. See Walsh, supra note 37, at 196.
The act of war defense is also rarely used because, as interpreted by courts,
there have been few, if any, instances within the United States that qualify as an act
of war. See id. Generally, courts interpret an act of war to require "extraordinary
government involvement in the operation of the facility," although there is no
statutory or common law definition of the phrase. Id. at 196 n.24; see Shell Oil Co.,
841 F. Supp. at 970 (noting that no cases define act of war defense).
The third party defense is frequently raised, but also is not very successful. See
Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup,
42 VAoD. L. REv. 1469, 1476-77 (1989); see also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1048-49
(discussing applicability of third party defense, ultimately rejecting it and holding
defendant liable); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1540 (W.D.
Mich. 1989) (rejecting defendant's assertion of third party defense on grounds
that contamination was not caused solely by third party); Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
at 1061 (finding that third party defense did not apply to case because there were
multiple causes for release of hazardous substances). To successfully raise the
third party defense, a party must prove that: (1) a third party solely caused the
release; (2) the third party had no contractual relationship with the defendant; (3)
the defendant exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances; and
(4) the defendant took reasonable precautions against foreseeable events. See
Weber, supra, at 1476-77. This defense is not very successful, however, primarily
because of courts' limited interpretation of "solely" caused and their broad inter-
pretation of "contractual relationship." See id.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (A) (i) (1994) (defining "contractual relation-
ship"). This defense is included in the definition of contractual relationship for
the purposes of § 9607(b) (3). See id. If the defendant acquired the contaminated
property after the disposal of hazardous substances, there is no contractual rela-
tionship within the meaning of the statute if the defendant can establish "by a
preponderance of the evidence: (i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility
the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous sub-
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In order to recover under CERCIA, a party must prove that (1) the
defendant falls into one of the categories of "covered persons";40 (2) a
"release"4 1 or a threatened release of a "hazardous substance" 42 from a
stance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on,
in, or at the facility." Id.; see Weber, supra note 38, at 1477 (finding definition of
contractual relationship to exclude purchasers who acquired property after con-
tamination with no knowledge of contamination). For a defendant to establish
that he or she "did not know and had no reason to know" of the contamination,
"the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate
inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability." 42 U.S.C.§ 9601(35) (B); see Weber, supra note 38, at 1477 (noting that purchasers have duty
to try to minimize liability). In determining whether an appropriate inquiry was
made, courts are to consider any specialized knowledge of the defendant, the
purchase price of the property, reasonably ascertainable information about the
property, the obviousness of contamination and the ease with which the contami-
nation can be discovered upon inspection. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (B).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(])-(4). There are four categories of people poten-
tially subject to CERCLA liability:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at
the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any per-
son who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person,
by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance ....
Id. Although at first glance it appears the phrase "from which there is a release, or
a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance" modifies only subparagraph four, courts interpret it to modify subpara-
graphs one through four inclusive. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1043 n.16. The
Shore Realty court reasoned, as most courts have, that putting the clause on the
same line as subparagraph four was merely a typographical error. See id. The
court noted:
When the Senate's compromise bill was printed in the Congressional Rec-
ord at the start of the debate, [it] followed the printing format of the
Senate version as reported [earlier]; in each case subparagraph (4)
ended with the words "selected by such person," and the commencing
clause "from which there is a release" was printed as a new line, support-
ing the reading [the court] give[s] it above.
Id. Compare 126 CONG. Rc. 30,921 (printing "from which there is a release" on
separate line from clause four), and id. at 30,908 (same) with id. at 30,961 (includ-
ing "from which there is a release" language as though continuation of clause
four).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (22) (1994). CERCLA defines "release," inter alia, as "any
spilling, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping,
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment .... " Id.
42. Id. § 9601(14). CERCLA defines "hazardous substance," inter alia, as
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b) (2) (A) of title
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance desig-
nated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste hav-
[Vol. 43: p. 219
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"facility" has occurred; 43 (3) the release or threatened release has caused
the plaintiff to incur response costs;4 4 and (4) the plaintiff's response costs
are necessary and consistent with the "national contingency plan."4 5 CER-
CIA provides that a current owner and operator of a facility and any "per-
ing the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6921] .... (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 33, (E) any hazardous air
pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.
§ 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mix-
ture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to
section 2606 of title 15.
Id. The statute defines the term "hazardous substance" through incorporation of
substances considered hazardous under other environmental legislation. See Shore
Realty, 759 F.2d at 1040 n.6. Congress "designed [CERCIA] 'to bring order to the
array of partly redundant, partly inadequate federal hazardous substances cleanup
and compensation laws."' Id. at 1040 (quoting ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 27, at
568). CERCLA accomplishes this by bringing all known hazardous substances to-
gether in one definition, as well as authorizing the EPA to designate additional
substances that "'may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or
the environment.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a)).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). CERCLA defines a "facility" as
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline....
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed,
or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer
product in consumer use or any vessel.
Id. Courts broadly interpret this definition. See United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The term 'facility'
should be construed very broadly to include 'virtually any place at which hazardous
wastes have been dumped, or otherwise disposed of.'" (quoting United States v.
Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985))). Courts have found the definition
of facility to include various places where hazardous waste was dumped. See Ward,
618 F. Supp. at 895 (finding facility at roadside); New York v. General Elec. Co.,
592 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding facility at dragstrip), superseded by
statute as stated in Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich.
1989); United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (D. Ariz.
1984) (finding facility at real estate subdivision).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The phrase "from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance" is considered "clumsy grammatically, and ambiguous." Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1044 n.18. The Shore Realty court noted that the absence of a comma fol-
lowing the words "threatened release" and the use of the words "which causes"
rather than "that causes" raises doubt as to "whether there is liability from a release
without the incurrence of 'response costs."' Id. Notwithstanding this ambiguity,
response costs are almost always the cause of CERCLA cases, making the issue
purely "academic." See id.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1)-(4). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has described the requirements for a prima facie case:
[I] n order to establish a prima facie case for recovery.., a plaintiff must
establish that: 1) the defendant falls into one of four categories of "cov-
ered persons"; 2) there has been a release or a threatened release of a
hazardous substance from a facility; 3) this release or threatened release
has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs; and 4) the plaintiffs re-
sponse costs are necessary and consistent with the National Contingency
Plan (NCP).
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son" who owned or operated any facility at the time of disposal are subject
to liability. 46 The statute circularly defines "owner or operator" as "any
person owning or operating such [a] facility." 47 Courts interpret this cir-
cularity, however, to mean the statutory terms have their ordinary mean-
ings. 48 In light of the definition of person and the statute's remedial
purpose, courts broadly interpret the scope of owner and operator liabil-
ity, including parent corporations as among those potentially liable. 49
B. Limited Liability for Parent Corporations
In contrast to the broad liability provisions of CERCLA, one of the
basic principles of the law of corporations is limited liability.50 Limited
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1219 (3d Cir.
1993) (citations omitted).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). A "person" is broadly defined as "an individual,
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial
entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdi-
vision of a state, or any interstate body." Id.
47. See id. § 9601(20) (A) (ii); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW HAzRDous WASTES & SUBSTANCES § 8.12 (1992) ("To the courts' occa-
sional chagrin, CERCLA defines 'operator', in 300 words more or less, as an
'operator."').
48. See RODGERS, supra note 47, at 1 n.2 ("'The circularity strongly implies,
however, that the statutory terms have their ordinary meanings rather than unu-
sual or technical meanings."' (quoting Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Mater-
ials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988))).
49. See Russo, supra note 28, at 157 (finding broad definition of owner and
operator has enabled courts to impose CERCLA liability on wide range of parties);
see also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1503 (11th
Cir. 1996) (holding limited partners can be liable as operators if they "in fact oper-
ated the facility at issue"); Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1996)
(adopting actual control standard for parent corporation operator liability);
United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding
United States can be liable as operator under actual control standard); FMC Corp.
v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (imposing
operator liability on United States for regulatory activities during World War II);
FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 846 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding chief
executive officer liable as operator); John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d
401, 408 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding successor corporation can be liable under CER-
CLA); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th Cir.
1992) (holding corporate principles liable as operators because they had authority
to control facility); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976
F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding excavator of contaminated development
site liable as operator under "authority to control" standard); Nurad, Inc. v. Wil-
liam E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding tenants
could be liable if they had authority to control facility); Riverside Mkt. Dev. v. In-
ternational Bldg. Prods., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (imposing operator
liability on majority shareholder when he "actually participate [d] in the wrongful
conduct prohibited by the Act").
50. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 89 ("Limited liability is a funda-
mental principle of corporate law."); see also Robert A. Kessler, With Limited Liability
for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation?, 36 FoR im L. REv. 235, 235 (1967-'
1968) (stating that popularity of corporation as choice of corporate form results
from "the corporation [being] universally associated in the popular mind with lim-
[Vol. 43: p. 219
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liability essentially provides that shareholders of a corporation, whether
individual or corporate, are not personally liable for the wrongful conduct
of the corporation unless they personally participate in the conduct.51
Courts regard the corporation as a legal entity that is separated from its
shareholders, officers and directors by a corporate veil.5 2 The sharehold-
ited liability"); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 5, at 294 ("[O]ne of the basic tenets
of corporate law is limited liability.").
51. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1991) ("Unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not
personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may be-
come personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct."); COOK, supra note 6,
at 19 ("[Limited liability] is a principle of law.., that, unless the corporate charter
or a constitutional statute provided otherwise, a stockholder, the full par value of
whose stock has been paid in, is not liable for and cannot be made to pay any sums
in addition thereto."); Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 14 (discussing limited
liability as protecting stockholders from personal liability, unless they participate in
liability creating conduct, either actively or passively). Many regard the protection
against unlimited personal liability as "the corporation's most precious characteris-
tic." Id. Many believe that limited liability is a significant reason for choosing the
corporate form of business. See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 24 (noting common
belief that "[i]f all other things are equal .... [the limited liability] advantage of
the corporate form should usually tip the scales toward incorporating"). In prac-
tice, however, limited liability may not serve as significant a function as originally
thought. See id. First, businesses usually purchase liability insurance for tort
claims. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 101. Second, typically employ-
ees with access to large amounts of money are bonded. See HAMILTON, supra note
3, at 24 (noting bonding occurs whether organization is corporation or partner-
ship). Third, corporations that lack sufficient assets to properly secure a loan
often must provide a personal guarantee froin their primary shareholder or share-
holders, canceling out the benefits of limited liability for that transaction. See id. at
24-25 (noting, however, that not all creditors require such guarantees, making lim-
ited liability advantageous). Overall, limited liability is a benefit of the corporate
form, but its utility is decreased by the use of other risk-spreading measures such as
insurance and bonding. See id.
52. See HENN, supra note 3, § 68, at 75 ("For most purposes, the corporation is
treated as an entity."); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 5, at 295 (noting that corpo-
ration is considered separate from its shareholders); Chandler & Grosser, supra
note 3, at 14 ("[A] parent corporation is typically regarded as an entity distinct
from its subsidiaries."). The notion that corporations enjoy a separate legal exist-
ence from their shareholders is "firmly entrenched in American business law."
Kessler, supra note 50, at 236. Chief Justice Marshall defined a corporation as "an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). Courts rec-
ognize corporations as persons within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. See Kessler, supra note 50, at 236 (noting that
recognition of corporation as person under Constitution "reinforce[s] the sepa-
rate entity concept"). But see HENN, supra note 3, § 68, at 76 (noting that corpora-
tions "do not enjoy the protection of the privileges-and-immunities-of-citizens
clause"). The corporation is a "legal fiction ... designed to serve convenience and
justice." FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 25, at 512. Treating the corporation as a
separate legal entity allows it to enter into contracts, possess and own real and
personal property, sue and be sued in its own name and "carry[ ] on business in
much the same manner as a natural person acting through agents of its own selec-
tion." Id. The benefits of separate corporate existence, however, are dependent
upon proper use of the corporate form. See Kessler, supra note 50, at 236-37
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ers, therefore, are liable for a corporation's obligations only to the extent
of their capital contribution.5 3 Courts will disregard corporate separate-
("'The State, granting to individuals the privilege of limiting their individual liabil-
ities for business debts by forming themselves into an entity separate and distinct
from the persons who own it, demands in turn that the entity take a prescribed
form and conduct itself, procedurally, according to fixed rules.'" (quoting Benin-
tendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 60 N.E.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. 1945))). Failure to adhere to
corporate formalities will result in courts "piercing the corporate veil," which is a
fictitious barrier separating shareholders from the corporation's liability. See
Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 14.
53. SeeAronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 431. There are numerous justifica-
tions for the doctrine of limited liability. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporationsfor
Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARv. L. REv. 986, 988 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Liability of Parent Corporation] (analyzing economic effects of limited liability for
parent corporations in CERCLA context). First, limited liability is said to "foster[ I
economic growth by encouraging investors to take risks." Id. Investors are gener-
ally "risk averse," in that when investing, they prefer a smaller guaranteed payoff
over a probable, yet larger, payoff. See id. at 989. One commentator noted that
"[w]ithout a rule limiting liability, the purchaser of one share of a corporation
would place her entire wealth at risk: if the corporation suffered a devastating loss,
creditors of the corporation could seek recovery from that shareholder for the
difference between the corporation's assets and its debts." Id. Because of the po-
tential for unlimited personal liability, risk-averse investors would not invest in ven-
tures likely to expose them to such liability. See id. By limiting the liability of the
investor to the amount of his or her investment, risk-averse investors are more
likely to participate in riskier ventures. See id.
Second, limited liability is said to be justified because it effectively shifts "a
substantial portion of the risk of business failure to creditors and away from share-
holders." LEWIs D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATION LAw AND POLIcY 242 (2d ed.
1988). Commentators have recognized that "limited liability does not eliminate
the risk of business failure," and because the loss must be borne by someone, the
question becomes by whom. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 98 ("Lim-
ited liability is an arrangement under which the loss largely lies where it falls."). If
there were unlimited liability, the shareholders of a corporation would bear the
entire risk of business failure. See id. With limited liability, however, "[e]ach inves-
tor has a guaranteed maximum on the loss he will bear." Id. Upon dissolution, if a
corporation has debt, the shareholder's investment is "wiped out first," in that the
shareholder is the first party that will not receive their capital investment back if
the corporation's liabilities exceed its assets. Id. To the extent that creditors rank
above investors in terms of repayment upon dissolution, "risk is 'shifted' from debt
investor to equity investor," but, to the extent that there is insufficient equity to pay
the corporation's debts and obligations, risk is shifted from the equity investor to
the debt investor. Id. It is appropriate to shift some of the risk of failure to volun-
tary creditors because, to a certain extent, they can anticipate these losses and
mitigate them by charging increased fees for capital, goods and services. See Liabil-
ity of Parent Corporation, supra, at 990. The appropriateness of shifting the risk of
failure to involuntary creditors, such as tort victims, however, is debatable as they
cannot mitigate their losses in advance. See id. ("These creditors do not charge
corporations in advance for assuming the risk that insolvency will leave the corpo-
ration unable to pay its obligations.").
Third and finally, limited liability is justified by the fact that it reduces the
costs of legal disputes. See id. at 996 ("If creditors could recover the outstanding
debts of the corporation from individual shareholders, the costs of litigation might
greatly exceed the gains from internalizing the costs of the corporation's activi-
ties."). If shareholders were personally liable for the debts of the corporation,
creditors could sue them individually until their claim was satisfied. See id. at 996-
20
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ness, however, and pierce the corporate veil in the interests of justice.5 4
Generally, a court will pierce the corporate veil when there is evidence of
misuse of the corporate form or evidence that the shareholders formed or
used the corporation for an illegal or fraudulent purpose.
55
Thus, it appears that the purposes of CERCLA and the purposes of
limited liability are at odds.5 6 Commentators have recognized that
97 (noting that if they could, creditors would "haul particular shareholders into
court and obtain judgments"). This would cause considerable expense both to
creditors and the corporation. See id. at 997 (noting that shareholders being sued
may seek contribution from other shareholders, making "apportioning liability...
complicated and costly").
54. See Kim, supra note 7, at 74 (noting that shareholder treating corporation
as alter ego or perpetrating fraud with corporation will cause court to pierce cor-
porate veil). The first justification under which courts will disregard corporate
separateness is when a corporation is the alter ego of its owner. See FLETCHER ET
AL., supra note 3, § 41.10, at 614 (noting that "when the corporation is the mere
alter ego, or business conduit of a person, it may be disregarded"). The rationale
for alter ego piercing is that "if the shareholders themselves, or the corporations
themselves, disregard the legal separation, distinct properties, or proper formali-
ties of the different corporate enterprises, . . . the law will ... disregard them so
far as is necessary to protect individual and corporate creditors." Id. The second
justification for piercing the corporate veil is when the shareholders established or
used the corporation to perpetrate a fraud. See id. § 41, at 602-03 (discussing cir-
cumstances when court will pierce corporate veil). There is general agreement
that "under some circumstances ... the corporation may be disregarded as an
intermediate between the ultimate person or persons or corporation and the ad-
verse party; and should be disregarded in the interest of justice in such cases as
fraud, contravention of law or contract, [or] public wrong .... Id.
55. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 41, at 603 (noting that "corporate veil
may be pierced upon a showing of improper conduct or fraudulent or unjust pur-
pose"). The standards for piercing the corporate veil vary from state to state. See
id. § 41.30, at 661-62 ("No precise formula is available to predict when a court
should disregard the corporate entity, each case being sui generis."). Generally
speaking, however, two requirements must be met. See id. at 662. First, "there
must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist." Id. Second, there must be evi-
dence that indicates "adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice." Id. The requirements to pierce the
corporate veil are applicable whether the corporation is owned by many sharehold-
ers, or only one, as in the case of a parent-subsidiary relationship. See id. Courts
consider certain factors, in varying combinations and degrees, in determining
whether to pierce. See id. Courts consider inadequate capitalization, the failure to
issue stock, the failure to adhere to corporate formalities, such as not holding di-
rectors and shareholders meetings, nonpayment of dividends, commingling of cor-
porate funds and overlap of officers and directors. See id. at 663. In addition,
using some combination of these factors, most jurisdictions require evidence that
adhering to corporate separateness would result in an unjust result or a fundamen-
tal unfairness. See id. at 664. Courts, however, are very reluctant to pierce the
corporate veil-piercing the corporate veil is the exception rather than the rule.
See id. § 41.10, at 614-15 ("The standards for the application of alter ego principles
are high, and the imposition of liability notwithstanding the corporate shield is to
be exercised reluctantly and cautiously.").
56. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 423 (noting that holding parent
corporations liable comports with CERCLA's broad liability goals, but "[o]n its
face .... violates a fundamental principle of the law of corporations-that share-
21
Stovall: Limiting Operator Liability for Parent Corporations under CERCLA:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
"[w] hen considering the liability of parent corporations for the environ-
mental torts of their subsidiaries, the issue is often whether the applicable
standard of liability derives from direct application of the statutory defini-
tions of CERC[A or from common law principles of corporate law."5 7 Cir-
cuit courts are split on this issue and the Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether parent corporations should be held directly or indirectly liable
under CERCLA. 58 Courts have adopted three different liability tests to
determine a parent corporation's liability. 59 First, many circuits hold par-
ent corporations directly liable if they had "actual control" over their sub-
sidiaries' affairs. 60 Second, some circuit courts have adopted an "authority
to control" standard for imposing direct liability on a parent corpora-
tion.6 1 Third, a minority of circuits, including the Sixth Circuit in Cordova
Chemical, hold that a parent corporation can be liable only when there is
evidence to warrant piercing the corporate veil.
62
holders . . . are liable for no more than the amount of their investment in the
corporation").
57. Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 14.
58. See id. at 24-25 (noting that Supreme Court has previously denied certio-
rari to decide what is appropriate liability standard). There is a wide disparity in
the circuit courts on the issue of what liability standard to apply to parent corpora-
tions, which many believe that the Supreme Court should remedy. See id. at 25.
Two commentators noted the confusion among the circuit courts:
[I]t should not be acceptable for federal courts to be operating under
different interpretations of CERCLA, a federal statute enacted to create
uniform environmental control and regulation. Courts have used three
approaches to address corporate owner liability under CERCLA § 107.
Some courts have analyzed corporate owner liability indirectly as owners.
Other courts have analyzed corporate owner liability directly as operators.
Finally, still another court has analyzed corporate owner liability indi-
rectly as an operator. The use of three different approaches to analyze
the same issue, and the resulting unsettled case law illustrates the confu-
sion and inadequacy of the direct/indirect liability in its present state.
Id. at 24-25.
59. Compare Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting
actual control standard for parent corporation liability), with United States v. Caro-
lina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (adopting authority to
control standard in holding corporate principles liable as operators), andJoslyn
Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to hold
parent corporation liable as operator unless corporate veil could be pierced).
60. For a discussion of the actual control standard for holding parent corpo-
rations directly liable as operators, see infra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of the authority to control standard for holding parent
corporations directly liable as operators, see infra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text.
62. For a discussion of the piercing the corporate veil indirect liability stan-
dard for parent corporations, see infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of Cordova Chemical, see infra notes 110-60 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43: p. 219
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C. Direct Liability
1. Actual Control Standard
In dealing with the issue of operator liability for parent corporations,
many courts hold that a parent corporation can be directly liable if the
parent exercised actual control over the actions of its subsidiary.6 3 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Rockwell
International Corp. v. IU International Corp., 6 4 was one of the first courts to
adopt the actual control standard for parent corporation operator liabil-
ity.65 Based on CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator," the court
concluded that "'only those who actually operate or exercise control over
the facility that creates an environmental risk can be held liable under
CERCLA."66
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.67 also adopted an actual control liability stan-
dard, holding a parent corporation directly liable as an operator under
CERCLA. 68 In Kayser-Roth, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
63. See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 254 (recognizing that direct parent operator lia-
bility through actual control standard is compatible with CERCLA); Lansford-
Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that courts should use actual control standard to adjudge parent opera-
tor liability); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th
Cir. 1993) (stating that actual and pervasive control is needed for liability);John S.
Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 408 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming imposi-
tion of liability on parent corporation under actual control standard); United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (adopting liability stan-
dard whereby parent will be responsible when it exercises "active involvement in
the activities of the subsidiary"); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp.
1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding parent liable because it exercised sufficient
control over facility).
64. 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
65. Id. at 1390 (determining liability based on whether parent actually oper-
ated or exercised control over facility).
66. Id. (quoting Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F.
Supp. 651, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). Specifically, the court found it significant that
owner or operator did not include those with only a security interest in the facility.
See id. (examining definition that excludes from liability those who "without partic-
ipating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership pri-
marily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility"). Because not
participating in the management of the facility was a prerequisite to avoiding liabil-
ity, the court concluded that participation in the management must be a basis for
liability. See id. The court refined its liability standard by stating that the "[m]ere
ability to exercise control as a result of the financial relationship of the parties is
insufficient for liability to attach. The entity must actually exercise control." Id.
67. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
68. See id. at 27 (" [W] e believe that a fair reading of CERCLA allows a parent
corporation to be held liable as an operator of a subsidiary corporation."). The
Kayser-Roth court adopted what came to be known as the actual control standard
for operator liability. See id. In Kayser-Roth, the government brought suit against
the parent corporation of an owner of a contaminated site for the cleanup costs
that the EPA incurred at that site. See id. at 25. The district court found that the
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sought to recover cleanup costs from the parent of a dissolved subsidiary
by alleging that it was both an owner and an operator of the site.69 The
court began by examining CERCLA's language and found that the statute
created two categories of potentially liable parties, owners and operators,
with two different standards of liability. 70 The court then determined that
CERCLA's legislative history provided no indication that Congress in-
tended to exclude parent corporations from "all persons" who are "opera-
tors."7 1 Thus, the Kayser-Roth court concluded that "the statute and its
legislative purpose and history reveals no reason why a parent corporation
cannot be held liable as an operator under CERCLA.
72
parent corporation "exerted practical total influence and control over [its subsidi-
ary's] operations," and accordingly held the parent liable as an operator. Id. at 27.
On appeal, after concluding that parent corporations could be directly liable, the
First Circuit established a standard for holding a parent liable as an operator by
stating:
Without deciding the exact standard necessary for a parent to be an oper-
ator, we note that it is obviously not the usual case that the parent of a
wholly owned subsidiary is an operator of the subsidiary. To be an opera-
tor requires more than merely complete ownership and the concomitant
general authority or ability to control that comes with ownership. At a
minimum it requires active involvement in the activities of the subsidiary.
Id.
69. See id. at 25. Kayser-Roth Corp. was the parent corporation of Stamina
Mills, Inc., a textile manufacturer that used trichloroethylene ("TCE"), a hazard-
ous substance, in its manufacturing operations. See United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.R.I. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990). There is
evidence that Stamina Mills improperly dumped TCE on its property, into landfills
and a into nearby river. See id. In 1979, surveys of the drinking water supplies in
the surrounding areas showed elevated levels of TCE, of which the EPA deemed
Stamina Mills the cause. See id. As a result, the EPA added the site to the National
Priorities List in 1982 and remediation began soon thereafter. See id. Stamina
Mills dissolved, so the EPA sued Kayser-Roth for contribution. See Kayser-Roth, 910
F.2d at 25.
70. See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26. The court first examined CERCLA's liabil-
ity provisions and definitions, finding operator to be defined circularly as any per-
son operating a facility. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (ii) (1994)). The
court then looked at the phrase "owner or operator" and determined that "Con-
gress, by including a liability category in addition to owner ('operators') connected
by the conjunction 'or,' implied that a person who is an operator of a facility is not
protected from liability by the legal structure of ownership." Id. Finally, the court
noted that CERCLA defined "person" broadly. See id. at 26 n.5 ("The statute de-
fines 'person' extremely broadly and certainly includes a parent corporation." (cit-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)). On the basis of these factors, the court concluded that
according to CERCLA's language, "corporate status, while relevant to determine
ownership, cannot shield a person from operator liability." Id. at 26.
71. See id. The court relied on New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985), which in reviewing Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA, determined
that the final version of the statute "imposed liability on classes of persons without
reference to whether they caused or contributed to the release or threat of re-
lease." Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26. Therefore, the First Circuit concluded, parents
could be potentially responsible parties under CERCLA. See id.
72. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26. The court continued by noting that other
courts that have considered the issue support its interpretation of operator liabil-
ity. See id. at 26-27 (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
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The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed its
adoption of the actual control test in John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co..73
In that case, the court relied on Kayser-Roth and reaffirmed its finding that
the statutory language and congressional intent support a direct liability
standard. 74 Accordingly, the court held a parent corporation liable for
the cleanup of oil gas waste produced at the subsidiary's gas and electric
company. 7
5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
adopted the actual control standard in Schiavone v. Pearce,7 6 finding it to
be consistent with both CERCLA's broad remedial scheme and the statu-
tory language. 77 In Schiavone, the current owner of a contaminated site
F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing operator liability under CERCLA);
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986) (adopting
direct operator liability standard for parents and finding that it is supported by
intent of Congress)). The Kayser-Roth court also considered and distinguished the
indirect operator liability standard, as adopted in Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L.
James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 ("We are
unpersuaded by [Joslyn Manufacturing] upon which Kayser relies most heavily to
support its position."). The Kayser-Roth court found the Joslyn Manufacturing court
was concerned with owner rather than operator liability and framed the issue
before it as "whether to 'impose direct liability on parent corporations for the vio-
lations of their wholly owned subsidiaries."' Id. (quotingJoslyn Manufacturing, 893
F.2d at 81) , At issue in Kayser-Roth, however, was whether the parent could be
liable as an operator because of its own activities, not for the activities of its subsidi-
ary. See id. (noting that narrow interpretation later given by United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit supported court's reading of Joslyn Manufacturing, see
also Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th
Cir. 1991) (refusing to follow Joslyn Manufacturing) and adopting direct liability
standard instead).
73. 992 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1993).
74. See id. at 408. The court first examined the liability provisions of CER-
CLA, recognizing that other courts included parent corporations as operators. See
id. at 404-05 ("Courts have interpreted [CERCLA] to include ... parent corpora-
tions when the parent can be considered an operator." (citing Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d
at 26)). The court then examined Congress' purpose in enacting CERCLA,
namely to make responsible parties pay for cleanups. See id. at 405 (stating that
"essential purpose" of CERCLA is "making 'those responsible for problems caused
by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying
the harmful conditions they created.'" (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumber-
land Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986))). Relying on these
findings and the Kayser-Roth court's imposition of liability on a parent corporation
without piercing the corporate veil, the court applied the Kayser-Roth liability stan-
dard to the instant case. See id. at 408 (noting that imposition of liability requires,
at minimum, "active involvement in the activities of the subsidiary" (citing Kayser-
Roth, 910 F.2d at 27)).
75. See id. (discussing evidence of parent's control over subsidiary, ultimately
concluding that there was sufficient evidence of "active involvement" in subsidi-
ary's activities, and therefore district court was not in clear error by imposing
liability).
76. 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996).
77. Id. at 255 ("A recognition of direct operator liability for parent corpora-
tions is both compatible with the statutory language and consistent with CERCLA's
broad remedial scheme."). In considering whether a parent corporation could be
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sued the parent corporation of the previous operator for cleanup costs
that the current owner incurred at its subsidiary's creosoting plant. 78 The
Second Circuit began its determination of the appropriate operator liabil-
ity standard by examining the legislative history of CERCLA and found
that "Congress enacted CERCLA with the expansive, remedial purpose of
ensuring 'that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or
injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions.'- 79 The court
determined that, because of the remedial nature of the statute, it should
liberally construe CERCLA to effectuate these congressional concerns. 80
The court's interpretation led to its conclusion that "[a]n interpretation
of CERCLA that imposes operator liability directly on parent corporations
whose own acts violate the statute is consistent with the general thrust and
held directly liable for the actions of its subsidiary, the court recognized that there
were courts that were unwilling to extend CERCLA liability beyond the "estab-
lished bounds of corporate common law," instead adhering to traditional veil-
piercing standards. Id. (citing United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584,
590-91 (6th Cir.), vacated, 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995); Joslyn Manufacturing, 893
F.2d at 82-83). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, how-
ever, "not unmindful of the weighty concerns" that courts expressed when adopt-
ing indirect liability, chose to subscribe to the views of the United States Courts of
Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits. Id.; see
Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 410, 413 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(relying on Schiavone because it subscribed to views adopted by six different circuits
in applying actual control standard).
78. See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 250 (reversing grant of summary judgment for
parent corporation for operator liability). American Creosoting Corp., the wholly
owned subsidiary of Union Camp, improperly disposed of, stored and handled
creosote, which it manufactured. See id. The property on which the plant was
located changed ownership a number of times in the 1960s and 1970s, and in
1984, the then owner, Pearce, implemented a plan to remediate the contamina-
tion at the request of the EPA. See id. Plaintiff Schiavone purchased the property,
and because of inadequate cleanup efforts by Pearce, incurred substantial
remediation costs. See id. Schiavone sued Kerr-McGee Corp., who purchased
American Creosoting Corp. from Union Camp in 1964, and Kerr-McGee im-
pleaded Union Camp for its activities during the time that it was still a parent
corporation. See id. at 251.
79. Id. at 253 (quoting S. REP. No. 96-848, at 13 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119). Accordingly, the court found that a primary goal of
CERCLA was to "extend liability to all those involved in creating harmful environ-
mental conditions." Id.
80. See id. at 253. The Second Circuit's interpretation comports with remedial
statutory construction principles, as well as the interpretation offered by the vast
majority of courts faced with CERCLA issues. See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water
Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that expansion of
liability to parent corporation is consistent with CERCLA's "broad remedial pur-
poses"); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338,
1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that courts construe CERCLA liberally to achieve
goals of statute); General Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281,
285 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting Congress intended that CERCLA be construed liber-
ally); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Because it
is a remedial statute, CERCLA must be construed liberally to effectuate its.., goals
. . . .").
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purpose of the legislation."
8 1
After concluding that the legislative intent of CERCLA supported di-
rect parent liability, the Second Circuit then considered whether there was
support in the statute itself for imposing direct liability.8 2 The court
found two instances in which the statutory language of CERCLA sup-
ported direct parent corporation liability.8 3 First, the statute imposes lia-
bility on both owners and operators indicating that CERCLA liability is
disjunctive; "'owner' liability and 'operator' liability denote two separate
concepts."84 The court found that in the parent-subsidiary context, this
distinction is particularly relevant because there are different standards of
liability for owners and operators. 85 For a parent corporation to be liable
as an owner for the actions of its subsidiary, courts must pierce the corpo-
rate veil. 86 In contrast, courts can directly impose operator liability when a
parent corporation, "due to the specifics of its relationship with its affili-
ated corporation [is deemed] to have had substantial control over the fa-
81. Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 253; accord United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24,
26 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that its analysis of legislative purpose of CERCLA
"reveals no reason why a parent corporation cannot be held liable as an opera-
tor"). The Schiavone court recognized that imposing liability on parent corpora-
tions is inconsistent with limited liability principles, but it nonetheless comports
with CERCLA's goals. See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 253-54.
82. See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 254 ("Courts imposing operator liability directly
on a parent corporation have drawn support not only from legislative intent, but
also from related statutory language.").
83. See id.
84. Id. The court found Congress' inclusion of both terms to be the "most
compelling argument" for imposing direct parent liability. Id. Numerous courts
have recognized the disjunctive nature of section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA. See Long
Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Goodwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364,
1367 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Obviously 'owner' and 'operator' are distinct concepts, else
Congress wouldn't have used two words."); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare
Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that owner and operator
liability are different); Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1220 ("There is general agree-
ment that under CERCLA, 'owner' liability and 'operator' liability denote two sep-
arate concepts. . . .");John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 408 (1st
Cir. 1993) (noting that operator liability is separate from owner liability); Kayser-
Roth, 910 F.2d at 26 ("Congress, by including a liability category in addition to
owner ('operators') connected by the conjunction 'or,' implied that a person who
is an operator of a facility is not protected from liability by the legal structure of
ownership.").
85. See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 254 ("This distinction has particular relevance in
the context of parent and subsidiary corporations where the theory of liability se-
lected mandates different bases of proof.").
86. See id. ("A finding of owner liability invokes the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship and can be made only in circumstances that permit corporate veil piercing.").
If the subsidiary is the record owner of the facility, a parent can only be liable as an
owner by disregarding the companies' separate existence and treating them as the
same company, as is done through piercing the corporate veil. See United States v.
USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 823 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T] raditional principles of corporate
law would not permit 'owner' liability to be extended to a corporate parent unless
piercing the corporate veil were warranted.").
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cility in question."87
Second, the court relied on the statutory definition of "person" as
support for holding a parent corporation directly liable as an operator.
8 8
Recognizing that the statute broadly defined "person" to include "a firm,
corporation, or commercial entity, among other things," the court found
that the language indicates an intent to include parent corporations
among those potentially liable.8 9 Therefore, based on the legislative in-
tent of Congress and the plain language of CERCLA, the Second Circuit
concluded that the parent corporation's liability should be analyzed under
the actual control standard.90
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in Lansford-CoaldaleJoint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp.91
Here, Lansford-Coaldale brought suit against the parent corporation of a
bankrupt lead smelter for contamination of the surrounding ground
water. 92 In determining the appropriate liability standard, the court first
noted that "lt] here is general agreement that under CERCLA, 'owner' lia-
bility and 'operator' liability denote two separate concepts and hence re-
quire two separate standards for determining whether they apply."
93
87. Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 254.
88. See id. at 255 ("An additional justification raised by courts in support of
this characterization of operator liability looks to the statute's definition of
'person.'").
89. Id. The court found that the language of the statute indicates intent to
hold a parent corporation liable, "if it is otherwise determined to have operated
the facility in question." Id.
90. See id. (adopting direct liability standard because it was "both compatible
with the statutory language and consistent with CERCLA's broad remedial
scheme"). Because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
parent exercised actual control, the court remanded the case for a liability deter-
mination under the newly adopted actual control standard. See id.
91. 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit also adopted the actual
control standard for determining parent corporation operator liability. See id. at
1221. The court relied on substantially similar grounds in adopting this standard
as the First and Second Circuits, particularly the disjunctive language imposing
liability on owners and operators, as well as the broad definition of person. See id.
at 1220-21.
92. See id. at 1213 (deciding on appeal whether district court appropriately
found parent corporation not liable). Tonolli Canada, a company engaged in the
business of lead smelting, incorporated a wholly owned subsidiary in Carbon
County, Pennsylvania, that participated in the same business. See id. In the early
1980s, Tonolli applied for a permit to dispose of hazardous waste at their site, to
which Lansford-Coaldale responded by commissioning a study on the probable
contamination that would result. See id. The study showed a threatened release of
hazardous waste into the authority's water supply. See id. Consequently, Lansford-
Coaldale filed suit against Tonolli Pennsylvania, Tonolli Canada and Tonolli Can-
ada's parent corporation, IFIM, but later amended the complaint, dropping their
suit against the bankrupt Tonolli Pennsylvania. See id.
93. Id. at 1220. The court relied on the fact that numerous federal courts and
commentators have already considered the issue, finding that there are two classes
of liable parties under the statute. See id. (citing United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990) (deciding standard for parent corporation
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Next, the court looked at Congress' legislative intent in enacting CER-
CLA. 94 The Third Circuit determined that it was clear "that Congress has
expanded the circumstances under which a corporation may be held lia-
ble for the acts of an affiliated corporation such that, when a corporation
is determined to be the operator of a subsidiary ... traditional rules of
limited liability for corporations do not apply."95 Finally, the Third Cir-
cuit found that CERCLA's language supports parent corporation liability,
"notwithstanding the traditional rule of limited liability in the corporate
context. '9 6 The court concluded, accordingly, that the actual control
standard was an appropriate balance between CERCLA's remedial pur-
pose and the benefits of limited corporate liability.9
7
operator liability); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988) (ad-
dressing "owned or operated" liability issue), superseded 6y statute as stated in Kelley
v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Oswald & Schipani,
supra note 5, at 268 (discussing liability provisions for owners and operators under
CERCLA); Liability of Parent, supra note 53, at 987 (considering owner and opera-
tor liability provisions in CERCLA in parent corporation context)).
94. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 (recognizing that Congress' intent was
difficult to discern with precision in CERCLA because of its lack of clarity and poor
draftsmanship). Many courts and commentators also express this view. See, e.g.,
Sandvos, supra note 9, at 863 ("The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is a mess."). Nevertheless, the Third
Circuit concluded that the scope of CERCLA liability included parent corpora-
tions. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 (noting that despite lack of complete
clarity in legislative history, it incidentally addressed parent liability issues).
95. Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221. Like the First and Second Circuits, this
court also found support for its decision in the fact that CERCLA is a remedial
statute, which courts should construe broadly. See id. (finding broad construction
necessary to accomplish CERCLA's "'essential purpose' of making 'those responsi-
ble for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and
responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created"' (quotingJohn
S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 405 (1st Cir. 1993))).
96. Id. at 1221 n.11. The court found that CERCLA makes an operator a
potentially liable party and that although "'operator' is defined circularly as any
person operating a facility, 'person' is defined broadly to include a firm, corpora-
tion, or commercial entity, among other things."' Id. (citations omitted). There-
fore, CERCLA's intent is to "hold a corporation liable for the environmental
violations of its subsidiaries and sister corporations, if it is otherwise deemed to
have operated the facility in question." Id.
97. See id. at 1221 ("[W]e thus adopt the actual control standard, which ap-
pears to strike the appropriate middle ground, balancing the benefits of limited
liability with CERCLA's remedial purposes."). After concluding direct liability was
the appropriate standard, the Third Circuit recognized there were "two competing
standards for the imposition of [direct] operator liability": the actual control test
and the authority to control test. Id. The court compared these tests and ulti-
mately adopted the former. See id. The actual control standard holds a corpora-
tion liable "when there is evidence of substantial control exercised by one
corporation over the activities of the other." Id. (citing Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27).
The court continued by stating that although corporate limited liability was the
general rule, under the actual control standard, when a corporation "played an
active role in the management of a corporation responsible for environmental
wrongdoing," it cannot escape liability by hiding behind the corporate form. Id.
To be an operator under the actual control test, the parent corporation must exer-
cise more control over its subsidiary than "the concomitant general authority or
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2. Capacity to Control Standard
The alternative direct liability test, followed by two circuits, is the ca-
pacity to control standard.98 Under this test, a court will hold a parent
corporation liable for the waste disposal actions of its subsidiary if the par-
ent possessed the authority to control those actions.99 In United States v.
Carolina Transformer Co.,100 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit adhered to the capacity to control standard for assessing
operator liability on a corporate officer and stockholder. 10 1 The court
ability to control that comes with ownership." Id. at 1222. Instead, a parent corpo-
ration must exercise "'actual participation and control' over the other corpora-
tion's decisionmaking." Id. This was the test advanced by the First Circuit in
Kayser-Roth. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27. The court contrasted the actual control
test with the authority to control test, under which a parent corporation can be
liable as an operator "as long as one corporation had the capability to control,
even if it was never utilized." Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221. The Third Circuit
found that the authority to control standard was too broad and "may unduly penal-
ize the corporation for a decision by that corporation to benefit from one of the
well-recognized and salutary purposes of the corporate form: specialization of
management." Id. For a further discussion of the authority to control standard,
see infra notes 98-102, and accompanying text.
98. See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding that district court correctly applied authority to control stan-
dard for determining officer and shareholder liability); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
there is "well-settled rule that 'operator' liability ... only attaches if the defendant
had authority to control the cause of the contamination at the time the hazardous
substances were released into the environment"). Whether the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kaiser Aluminum is applicable
to parent corporations is questionable. See id. at 1342. In that case, the court held
specifically that an excavator of a facility was liable as an operator because he pos-
sessed the authority to control the site development. See id. ("We conclude ...
allegations of [the excavator's] operations on the property tend to show that [the
excavator] had sufficient control over this phase of the development to be an 'op-
erator' under section 9607(a) (2) [of CERCLA].").
99. See Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 30 ("[A] n entity is an 'operator' if it sim-
ply has the authority to control waste disposal and other matters relating to the
management of the business at the site."). The authority to control standard is
significantly more broad than the actual control standard. See Stewart & Campbell,
supra note 28, at 9 ("The broadest theory attaches parent liability as an 'operator'
on the basis of the parent's 'capacity to control' the subsidiary, a standard that
disregards the corporate separateness of the parent altogether."). One commenta-
tor explained one problem with the authority to control test:
Every parent corporation, by virtue of the power it wields over its subsidi-
ary, could control that subsidiary's activities, including those activities re-
lating to its environmental matters and the operation of a facility. A
literal application of the capacity to control test would thus lead to a find-
ing of parent liability in every case involving a CERCLA violation by a
subsidiary.
LyndaJ. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis Under CERCLA: Find-'
ing Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 223, 260 (1994).
100. 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).
101. Id. at 837 (affirming adoption of standard imposing liability "so long as
the authority to control the facility was present" (citing Nurad, Inc. v. William E.
Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992))). Only months before the
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reasoned that this standard was appropriate based on CERCLA's defini-
tion of operator as well as on the principle that "'a party who possessed
the authority to abate the damage caused by the disposal of hazardous
substances but who declined to actually exercise that authority by under-
taking efforts at a cleanup"' should be liable. 10 2
D. Indirect Liability Standard-Piercing the Corporate Veil
Two courts, including the Sixth Circuit in Cordova Chemical, have
adopted an indirect liability standard, holding that courts may impose op-
erator liability on a parent corporation only when the requirements to
pierce the corporate veil are met. 10 3 The Fifth Circuit, in Joslyn Manufac-
turing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 1 0 4 was the first court to hold that a parent
corporation could only be indirectly liable as an operator. 10 5 In Joslyn
Carolina Transformer decision, the Fourth Circuit first adopted the authority to con-
trol test in Nurad. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842. In Nurad, the owner of contaminated
property sued the previous tenants of the property to recover the costs incurred in
removing several underground storage tanks. Id. at 840. The court found that the
tenant defendants "need not have exercised actual control in order to qualify as
operators under [section] 9607(a) (2), so long as the authority to control the facil-
ity was present." Id. at 842. Although Nurad did not deal with issues of corporate
liability, and therefore the interaction between limited liability principles and the
authority to control standard, the Carolina Transformer court adopted Nurad's rea-
soning in whole. See Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 836-37 (noting that because
courts impose section 9607 (a) (2) liability on one who owned or operated facility at
time of disposal, "Nurad's holding as to the liability of a person who owned a facil-
ity at a time when hazardous waste was spilling or leaking, applies with equal force
to a person who operated a facility at such a time").
102. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 836-37 (quoting Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842).
In Carolina Transformer, two of the defendants were the sole stockholder and a
director of the defendant company. See id. at 837. Both testified in deposition that
they were responsible for the company's property and operations. See id. Applying
the authority to control standard, the court concluded that the district court did
not err in holding there was sufficient evidence to find defendants liable as opera-
tors, "for each of them had a right to control [the company's] operations." Id.
Although Carolina Transformer does not deal with the issue of parent corpora-
tion operator liability, its holding is nevertheless applicable to that situation be-
cause traditional corporate law principles treat parent corporations and
shareholders similarly. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 25, at 514 (noting that
corporation is entity distinct from shareholders, whether individual or corporate).
The Carolina Transformer court, and other courts that adhere to the authority to
control standard, adopted this broad standard in the face of traditional limited
liability principles, indicating that this standard "disregards the corporate separate-
ness of the parent altogether." Stewart & Campbell, supra note 28, at 9.
103. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir.) (en
banc) (holding that parent corporation will be liable only when there is sufficient
evidence to warrant piercing corporate veil), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997);
Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
CERCLA does not authorize disregarding corporate law principles).
104. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
105. Id. at 82-83. The appellant argued that the Fifth Circuit should follow
several other courts and liberally construe the definition of owner or operator to
include parent corporations, but the court declined to do so. See id. at 82 (decid-
ing not to follow "the several courts, including the Second Circuit, which have
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Manufacturing, the former owner of a facility sought contribution for
cleanup costs from the parent corporation of a former operator. 10 6 The
court looked first to the language of CERCLA, and found that it
"[s]ignificantly... [did] not define 'owners' or 'operators' as including
the parent company of offending wholly-owned subsidiaries."10 7 Likewise,
the court could not find sufficient support in CERCLA's legislative history
to warrant disregarding the principles of limited liability. 10 8 Thus, the
court concluded that "[w]ithout an express Congressional directive to the
contrary, common-law principles of corporation law, such as limited liabil-
ity, govern [the] court's analysis" and the appropriate liability standard is
piercing the corporate veil. 10 9 In the context of the conflicting interpreta-
tions of CERCLA operator liability for parent corporations described
above, the Sixth Circuit decided Cordova Chemical.
III. UNITED STA TES v. Cowoo VA MICAL CO.
A. Case Background
In Cordova Chemical, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of what stan-
dard courts should apply when adjudging whether a parent corporation is
extended CERCLA liability to parents"). The Fifth Circuit's refusal to adopt the
liberal construction of the CERCLA language earned the decision the characteriza-
tion as "[s] omething of an anomaly." John S. G. Worden, CERCLA Liability of Par-
ent Corporations for the Acts of Their Subsidiaries, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 73, 79 (1993-1994).
106. SeeJoslyn Manufacturing, 893 F.2d at 81-82 (noting that former owner ap-
pealed district court's grant of summary judgment for parent corporation). Joslyn
Manufacturing arose from the contamination of a former creosoting plant built
and operated by Lincoln Creosoting Co., a subsidiary ofT.L.James & Co. Id. at 81.
In 1950, Joslyn Manufacturing Co. purchased Lincoln and operated the plant until
1969, when one of the numerous owners that the property had after 1969
purchased it. See id. at 82. Joslyn was ordered to clean up the facility and, there-
fore, brought suit against T.L. James & Co. and the other owners of the property
for contribution. See id. at 80-82.
107. Id. at 82.
108. See id. The court found it "'elementary that the meaning of a statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed,
and if it is plain ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms."' Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). The
court continued by stating that "[t]he 'normal rule of statutory construction is that
if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially cre-
ated concept, it makes that intent specific,"' and "[a]ny bold rewriting of corpora-
tion law in this area is best left to Congress." Id. at 82-83 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l
Bank v. NewJersey, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)). The court rejected the appellant's
argument that CERCLA represents an "'inherent' underlying intent of Congress
to hold those who profited from hazardous waste sites responsible for the cost of
cleanup and a desire to effectuate a timely cleanup of these sites." Id. at 83. Ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit, "'[s]ilence is most eloquent, for such reticence while
contemplating an important and controversial change in existing law is unlikely.'"
Id. (quoting Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-
67 (1979)).
109. Id. The court remarked that "[i]f Congress wanted to extend liability to
parent corporations it could have done so, and it remains free to do so." Id."
250
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/8
liable as an operator under CERCLA. 10 In deciding the case, the court
adopted a piercing the corporate veil test.1 1 Thus, courts can only hold
parent corporations indirectly liable for the environmental wrongs of their
subsidiaries. 112
Cordova Chemical arose out of the contamination of a chemical manu-
facturing plant in Dalton Township, Michigan, which began in 1957.113
Chemical manufacturing operations contaminated the ground water flow-
ing underneath the site, as well as the surrounding soil and surface
water.1 14 The site's initial owner, Ott Chemical Company ("Ott I"), ini-
tially contaminated the property by manufacturing and disposing of chem-
110. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 575 (6th Cir.) (en
banc) ("A central concern on appeal is the criteria required under CERCLA
before a parent corporation can be held financially liable for pollution that oc-
curred on a site owned by a subsidiary."), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997). The
Sixth Circuit noted that " [t] his appeal highlights the difficulty that often attends
the apportionment of liability for the cleanup costs of sites that have been sub-
jected to long-term environmental degradation." Id.
111. See id. at 580 (holding that liability standard for parent corporations is
"whether the degree to which it controlf its subsidiary and the extent and manner
of its involvement with the facility, amount to the abuse of the corporate form that
will warrant piercing the corporate veil and disregarding the separate corporate
entities of the parent and subsidiary").
112. See id. (rejecting district court's direct liability standard as basis for fixing
operator liability). The Sixth Circuit held "that where a parent corporation is
sought to be held liable as an operator... based upon the extent of its control of
its subsidiary which owns the facility, the parent will be liable only when the re-
quirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are met." Id.
113. See id. at 575. The Sixth Circuit noted that the "environmental damage
occurred over a period of decades and during the watch of several owners" making
the apportionment of liability especially difficult. Id.
114. See id. From approximately 1959 until 1986, a number of owners used
the site for chemical manufacturing to produce a variety of synthetic organic inter-
mediate chemicals that are used for pharmaceutical, veterinary and agricultural
purposes. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 555 (W.D.
Mich. 1991). affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., United States v. Cordova Chem.
Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.) (en banc), and cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997).
Before to chemical manufacturing, the quality of the ground water beneath the
site was considered "excellent." See id. Nevertheless, within two years of operation,
because of improper chemical waste disposal, the water pumped in for use in the
manufacturing process was contaminated. See id. at 555-56. Tests conducted in
1964 on the groundwater flowing underneath the facility'confirmed the contami-
nation. See id. at 555. Chemical manufacturing and waste disposal practices also
caused contamination of the soil and surface water at the site. See id. at 555-56.
Specifically, the owners disposed of wastewaters and other chemical waste in un-
lined lagoons at the northwestern edge of the property. See id. at 556. Because the
lagoons were unlined, most of the hazardous material seeped into the ground and
water. See id. The owners also caused contamination by their burial and slitting of
hundreds of drums containing hazardous substances in a sandy pit. See id. In addi-
tion, hundreds of gallons of chemicals spilled onto the property from train cars.
See id. Also, the manufacturing companies dumped buckets of hazardous chemi-
cals that spilled during the manufacturing process into the woods on the property.
See id. Finally, chemical waste frequently overflowed from a cement-lined equaliza-
tion basin on the property. See id. All of this hazardous waste seeped into the
ground and "migrated away from the site via the aquifier to the southeast" and
1998] NOTE
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icals on it when Ott I controlled the site from 1957 to 1965.115 In 1965,
Ott Chemical Company ("Ott II"), a wholly owned subsidiary of CPC Inter-
national, Inc. ("CPC"), took over ownership of the site, as well as the man-
ufacturing operations.' 16 In 1972, the Story Chemical Company ("Story")
mixed with two waterways named Little Bear Creek and the Unnamed Tributary.
See id.
115. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 575. It was during Ott I's ownership of
the property that contamination was most severe. See CPC International, 777 F.
Supp. at 556. Ott I disposed of chemical waste in unlined lagoons, buried drums
and overflowing equalization basin and collection buckets. See id. Beginning in
1965, when Ott I still owned the facility, it sporadically used purge wells to treat the
contamination problem. See id. They were mildly successful in cleaning the
ground water and slowing the spread of contamination away from the site. See id.
Ott I had "an active board of directors that was significantly involved in the
management of the company." Id. at 557. The leading officer of Ott I was Arnold
Ott, who served at various times as president, chief executive officer, treasurer,
board member and chairman of the board. See id. Arnold Ott was also the com-
pany's largest shareholder. See id. In 1963, Alexander McFarlane, Corn Products
Company's ("CPC") chairman of the board, joined the Ott I board of directors.
See id. McFarlane was impressed by Ott I, and became interested in acquiring Ott I
and its management group. See id. In June 1965, the Ott I board approved a reor-
ganization for the purchase of the company by CPC in September. See id. Three
months before the sale of Ott I, Arnold Ott became a manager at CPC, while con-
tinuing to act as Ott I's president, chief executive officer and director. See id. In
September 1965, CPC created the Four Lakes Chemical Company, a wholly owned
subsidiary, for the purposes of acquiring Ott I. See id. Immediately before the sale,
Four Lakes' board of directors elected its officers, including Arnold Ott and Ott I's
vice-president of marketing, James Eiszner, and voted to change the company's
name to the Ott Chemical Company ("Ott II"). See id. At the end of September,
Ott I's assets and specified liabilities were sold to Four Lakes in return for 75,300
shares of CPC common stock. See id. Two days after the sale, Four Lakes officially
became Ott II. See id.
116. See CPC International, 777 F. Supp. at 557. Ott II functioned almost iden-
tically to Ott I, in that it manufactured the same chemicals at the same plant, with
the same disposal practices. See id. at 558. Pollution of the soil, surface water and
ground water continued through Ott II's ownership of the site as Ott II also al-
lowed chemical waste to seep into the ground from the unlined lagoons, buried
drums, overflowing equalization basin and buckets. See id. at 555-56. Ott II also
attempted to remediate the ground water contamination problem through the use
of purge wells. See id. at 558. Manufacturing under Ott II, however, significantly
increased as a result of contributions from CPC to help it expand. See id. In-
creased production created "substantially greater amounts" of hazardous chemical
waste, which was disposed of in newly expanded unlined lagoons. See id. In addi-
tion to contributing millions of dollars to Ott II's expansion efforts, CPC was ac-
tively involved in almost every aspect of Ott II's operations. See id. First, CPC
officials almost exclusively made up and controlled Ott II's board of directors. See
id. At all times there were no fewer than three CPC-affiliated directors on Ott II's
11 person board, for nearly three years CPC had majority control, and at one
point, CPC controlled the entire board of directors. See id. In addition, CPC, as
exclusive shareholder of Ott II, controlled the selection of all board members, and
when CPC executives were not attending Ott Il's board meetings, the CPC direc-
tors serving on the Ott II board reported back to CPC about Ott II programs. See
id. at 558-59. CPC also exerted significant control over Ott II's day-to-day affairs.
See id. at 559. Although technically Ott II managers made decisions regarding op-
erating policies, CPC actively participated in this decision making through high-
ranking CPC officers serving in Ott II management positions. See id. In addition,
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purchased the site from Ott II and continued operations until it went
bankrupt in 1977.117
A concerted effort to remediate the property began in 1977, following
Story's bankruptcy, when the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
("MDNR") assessed the site and tried to attract a purchaser.1 18 On Octo-
several people served simultaneously as top officials in both CPC and Ott II. See id.
"CPC officials thus played decisive roles in Ott II's policy-making structure. As top
officers at Ott II, these CPC officials exerted significant control and bore ultimate
responsibility over decision making at the subsidiary in areas including waste dispo-
sal, sales, marketing, manufacturing, purchasing and personnel." Id. CPC also
controlled policy making at Ott II through its "development company," a division
of CPC with oversight responsibility over Ott II and other CPC subsidiaries with
scientific or technical backgrounds. Id. The development company reviewed Ott
II's operating procedures, made recommendations regarding finances and person-
nel, pressured it to generate more profits and decided who would represent CPC
on Ott's board. See id. at 560. "In sum, CPC engaged in active participation in and
significant control over Ott II policy matters and decision-making both internally
through representation within Ott II's management and board and externally
through the supervision of CPC's development company." Id. at 561.
Second, in addition to participating in Ott II's management and board, CPC
"actively participated in Ott II environmental matters." Id. CPC employed a gov-
ernmental and environmental affairs director named G.R.D. Williams. See id. Wil-
liams coordinated all pollution activities for CPC, and starting in 1966, managed
Ott II's environmental matters, including choosing a waste disposal system. See id.
Other CPC officials were also involved in Ott II's waste disposal practices, includ-
ing negotiating the use of a county wastewater treatment system. See id. at 561-62.
Third, CPC controlled all of Ott II's communications with state and federal
regulators. See id. at 561. When Ott II received questionnaires regarding its waste
disposal practices, CPC required it to either consult with CPC for appropriate an-
swers or send it to CPC to answer. See id. When Ott II had unannounced visitors
from regulators, Williams instructed the company to stall them while awaiting ad-
vice from CPC. See id.
Fourth, CPC "exerted significant control over Ott II's finances." Id. at 562.
CPC's development company required Ott II to prepare monthly financial reports,
and each year CPC reviewed and approved a "detailed financial plan" for Ott II's
financial operations. See id. In addition, CPC advanced more than $5 million to
Ott II and assumed a number of its loans. See id. Also, CPC required that Ott II
obtain approval for capital expenditures, initially more than $5000, and in 1968,
more than $200,000. See id. Finally, and most importantly, Ott II's funds were
commingled with CPC's in a joint account. See id.
Overall, CPC exerted control over Ott II's finances, its board of directors and
officers, its communications with governmental officials and its environmental de-
cisions. See id. at 558-62.
117. See id. at 562. Story Chemical Company ("Story") purchased the facility
for $6.6 million in cash and a $4 million note. See id. CPC sold Ott II without the
knowledge or consent of the Ott II board. See id. Story began chemical manufac-
turing operations in June 1972, but it was suffering from financial problems by
1974. See id. In an effort to save money, Story stopped use of the purge well system
altogether, "resulting in the continued, unchecked spread of contamination away
from the site through groundwater." Id. at 556. Story could not recover from
financial difficulty and filed for bankruptcy in 1976. See id. at 562. Upon the bank-
ruptcy of Story, title to the property vested in the trustee in bankruptcy, who at-
tempted to find a buyer. See id.
118. See id. Acting in their regulatory capacity, officials from the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) visited the site to assess the severity and
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ber 13, 1977, Cordova Chemical Company ("Cordova California") agreed
to purchase the site and assist in its cleanup.1 19 Cordova California was
about to commence manufacturing operations in 1978 when it created its
own wholly owned subsidiary, Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan
nature of its environmental problems. See id. The environmental problems on the
property were readily apparent. See id. As the district court noted:
Groundwater pumped to the surface contained foam and a brownish
color like root beer. The stench of chemicals permeated the air. Soil
excavation revealed the taint of toxic pollution, showing purplish colors.
Hundreds of chemical drums, many piled atop each other, lay around
the site, randomly strewn among trees, across pavement and into sandy
pits. Many of the drums and barrels were crushed, corroded and leaking,
with their contents seeping into the ground. Chemical waste by-products,
including thousands of broken bottles, littered the land.
Id. at 562-63. The MDNR found potentially deadly toxins at the site, including
tanks of explosive phosgene gas, deadly if released into the air, and probable
human carcinogens such as benzene, phenol, methylene chloride and methyl iso-
cyanate. See id. at 563. In light of the severity of the environmental problems, the
MDNR immediately began efforts to clean up the site. See id. At the time, how-
ever, there was no environmental legislation such as CERCLA or a state equivalent
that would permit the MDNR to clean up the site and then sue for contribution.
See id. To clean up the site, the MDNR needed a specific legislative appropriation,
which it sought to expedite in early 1977. See id. Remediation efforts by the
MDNR also included looking for a purchaser for the property who would partici-
pate financially in cleanup efforts, which would reduce the money needed from
the state legislature. See id.
119. See id. at 564. In March 1977, officials from Aerojet-General Corp., of
which Cordova was only a division at the time, met with the MDNR to discuss
purchasing the site. See id. at 563. At first, Aerojet was not interested, partially
because of the severe contamination, but it later entered into negotiations with
MDNR to purchase the property. See id. at 563-64. Aerojet needed the facility to
manufacture ethelenimine, a chemical used in Cordova's manufacturing plant. See
id. at 563. Negotiations centered around the extent that Aerojet would participate
in the cleanup with Aerojet agreeing to fund remediation of some of the pre-ex-
isting contamination in exchange for promises about future cleanup obligations.
See id. at 564. In anticipation of the purchase, Aerojet incorporated the Cordova
division as Cordova Chemical Company ("Cordova California"), which became a
wholly owned subsidiary of Aerojet. See id. On October 13, 1977, MDNR and Cor-
dova California entered into a "stipulation and consent order," and one day later,
Cordova California officially purchased Story's assets for $2.5 million. See id. The
agreement addressed the cleanup obligations of the respective parties. See id. at
564-65. The MDNR agreed to dispose of the approximately 8700 fifty-five-gallon
drums of waste and an estimated 8000 cubic yards of solid chemical waste, sludge
and soil. See id. at 565. Cordova California agreed to eliminate the phosgene gas
and pay the MDNR $600,000 for its cleanup efforts. See id. According to the agree-
ment, following Cordova California's payment of the $600,000, it was not to have
"'any responsibility or liability in connection with any other corrective actions
which the Department of Natural Resources or any other governmental agency
may hereafter deem necessary.' Id. The agreement, however, did not provide a
total cleanup of the site's environmental problems because of its silence regarding
the ground water contamination problem and the fact that there were 71,000 cu-
bic yards of contaminated soil, rather than the stipulated 8000 cubic yards. See id.
at 566. The Michigan Legislature appropriated $1.27 million for MDNR's cleanup
of the site, and following its passage, Cordova California and the MDNR fulfilled
their cleanup obligations under the agreement. See id. at 566, 567.
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("Cordova Michigan") and transferred ownership of the site to it.120 As
the owner of the facility, Cordova Michigan manufactured chemicals there
until 1986.121 In 1981, pursuant to its authority under CERCIA, the EPA
became involved with the site by investigating how to remedy the severe
environmental problems in the soil and ground water. 12 2 The EPA placed
120. See id. at 568. After Cordova California's incorporation and acquisition
in 1977, it began construction to convert the facility into a manufacturing plant for
ethelenimine. See id. On November 2, 1978, with construction complete and man-
ufacturing about to begin, Cordova California created Cordova Chemical Com-
pany of Michigan ("Cordova Michigan"). See id. Cordova California capitalized its
subsidiary with $250,000 in common stock and $2.8 million in additional paid-in
capital. See id.
121. See id. At the time chemical manufacturing occurred, a subsidiary of Aer-
ojet's subsidiary owned the site. See id. Despite their separate corporate exis-
tences, however, Cordova California and Cordova Michigan operated as a single
entity and performed the functions of the former Cordova division of Aerojet. See
id.
Cordova California handled the day-to-day operations of Cordova Michigan,
including solicitation of business, processing of orders received, marketing, ac-
counting, setting the sales schedule and determining production quotas. See id. at
569. Aerojet, however, controlled both Cordovas' board of directors, management
and financial affairs. See id. at 569-70. After the incorporation of Cordova Michi-
gan, both Cordovas' boards became inactive, never holding a board meeting. See
id. at 569. In addition, Aerojet employees entirely comprise both boards and they*
"essentially functioned to consent to the policies established by management." Id.
Aerojet employees also completely dominated the management of the Cor-
dova companies. See id. For example, numerous individuals simultaneously held
positions in Aerojet and either or both of the subsidiaries. See id. at 569-70. The
president of the three companies was the same person on at least two occasions
and many others held the same position in the three companies. See id. In addi-
tion, managers of the subsidiaries reported directly to Aerojet and Aerojet man-
aged all personnel decisions. See id. at 570. "As a result of this widespread
involvement in the management of its subsidiaries, Aerojet participated in and
controlled decision-making in all facets of the company, including sales, market-
ing, manufacturing and waste disposal." Id.
Finally, Aerojet exercised total financial control over both of the subsidiaries.
See id. The three companies commingled funds in that neither subsidiary had the
authority to open a bank account and all money earned by the subsidiaries was
deposited into Aerojet's account. See id. In addition, "Aerojet assigned $25 million
in worthless debt owed to it by Cordova Michigan to Cordova California." See id.
The Sixth Circuit relied on the district court's observations regarding condi-
tions at the site during Cordova's ownership. See United States v. Cordova Chem.
Co., 113 F.3d 572, 575-77 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct 621 (1997).
The district court essentially found that neither Cordova company exacerbated the
contamination at the site. See id. at 577. Cordova Michigan did not bury waste,
dump it into the ground or dispose of it in the unlined lagoons. See id. Cordova
Michigan repaired the equalization basin and chemical sewer system and disposed
of its chemical waste off-site. See id.
122. See CPC International, 777 F. Supp. at 556. Congress enacted CERCLA in
1980, authorizing the President to use the Superfund to pay for the cleanup of a
site and then to sue the responsible parties for contribution. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(1994) (requiring contribution by owners, operator, transporters and generators
for remediation of contaminated sites). The President delegated this power to the
EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. § 168 (1982), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,418, 3 C.F.R. § 187 (1983).
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the site on the National Priorities List, and it is currently being cleaned in
accordance with the EPA's remediation plan. 123
The EPA filed suit against CPC, MDNR, Cordova Michigan, Cordova
California and Aerojet, the parent corporation of both Cordova compa-
nies.1 24 The district court made extensive findings regarding the site and
its various owners, holding CPC, Aerojet, Cordova California and Cordova
Michigan liable for cleanup costs under section 107(a) of CERCLA. 125
The court did not hold MDNR liable.' 26 Aerojet, CPC, Cordova California
and Cordova Michigan appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the
123. See CPC International, 777 F. Supp. at 556. Congress included the Na-
tional Priorities List as part of CERCLA to list the locations in need of long-term
action. See id. The Dalton Township site was ranked 137th among the most con-
taminated sites in the country. See id. At the time the district court heard the case,
the EPA was developing a three-phase, multi-million dollar plan to remediate the
soil, surface water and ground water at the site. See id.
124. See id. at 554. The district court, by prior order separated the case into
three phases: liability, remedy and insurance coverage. See id. at 554 n.1. In CPC
International, the court adjudicated the liability phase, the result of which was ulti-
mately heard on appeal in Cordova Chemical See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 572.
125. See CPC International, 777 F. Supp. at 581. The EPA, MDNR and the Cor-
dova defendants asserted that CPC was liable as a past owner or operator of the
site. See id. at 571. The district court, relying on the language of the statute,
adopted the actual control test for determining parent corporation operator liabil-
ity. See id. at 573. The court considered numerous factors when determining
whether to hold CPC liable as an operator, including CPC's participation in Ott
II's board of directors and in policy matters such as manufacturing, finances, per-
sonnel and waste disposal. See id. After making a fact-specific inquiry, the district
court held "CPC is directly liable under section 107(a) (2) as an operator because
CPC actively participated in and exerted significant control over Ott II's business
and decision-making." Id. at 574. The court found it unnecessary to consider
CPC's owner liability under common law veil piercing. See id. at 575.
As for Aerojet and its subsidiaries, the EPA, MDNR and CPC asserted claims
for current owner and operator liability, past owner or operator liability and ar-
ranger liability. See id. at 578. As to present owner liability, the district court found
liability to turn on the question of whether piercing Aerojet's corporate veil was
appropriate. See id. Applying state piercing law and engaging in a fact specific
inquiry, the court pierced Aerojet's veil, holding both Aerojet and Cordova Michi-
gan liable as the current owners of the site. See id. at 578-79. The court imposed
owner liability under section 107(a) (2) on Cordova California because it was the
owner of the site from October 1977 to November 1978, a period in which hazard-
ous waste disposal occurred. See id. at 579. The court assessed Aerojet's liability, as
a parent corporation, under the same standard applied to CPC and held Aerojet
directly liable. See id. at 580. Because the district court imposed direct liability on
Aerojet, it did not apply the piercing the corporate veil test. See id. Therefore, the
court held Aerojet and Cordova Michigan liable as present owners of the facility,
and held Aerojet and Cordova California liable as owners or operators at the time
disposal occurred. See id. at 580-81.
126. See id. at 581. CPC and the Cordova defendants alleged MDNR should
be liable as an operator and CPC alleged MDNR was liable as an arranger at the
site. See id. at 576. On the arranger liability issue, the district court found that
MDNR and Cordova California made no arrangement with respect to the ground-
water contamination, and therefore, there could be no arranger liability. See id. at
576-77. Regarding operator liability, the court found that although a state can be
liable as an operator in circumstances "when it permits hazardous waste disposal to
[Vol. 43: p. 219
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district court's decision in part and affirmed in part. 127 Three months
after the Sixth Circuit's decision, the court granted a rehearing of the case
en banc, vacating the earlier appellate decision and restoring the case to
the docket as pending appeal.
128
B. The Sixth Circuit's Analysis
The issue before the Sixth Circuit was what standard the court should
apply in determining the liability of a parent corporation under CERCIA
for pollution on a subsidiary's property. 129 The court held that a parent
corporation could be held liable as an operator under CERCLA only when
the requirements for piercing the corporate veil are met. 130 The Sixth
Circuit began its analysis by examining CERCLA's liability provisions to
determine who could be potentially liable for the cleanup costs of a pol-
luted site. 131 The court determined that the potentially responsible par-
ties relevant to this case were the present owner and operator of the
facility and the owner or operator of the facility at the time of the hazard-
occur at a site over which it exercises dominion or control," MDNR actions were
insufficient to constitute such control. Id. at 577-78.
127. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir.) (re-
versing judgments of liability against CPC, Aerojet and both of its subsidiaries),
vacated, 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995). The Sixth Circuit voted 2-1 to overturn the
district court's ruling, concluding "that a parent corporation incurs operator liabil-
ity pursuant to section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA, for the conduct of its subsidiary
corporation, only when the requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are
met under state common law." Sixth Circuit Votes 2-1 to Overturn Liability Ruling
Against PRP's, MEALE's LITIG. REP.,July 26, 1995, at 3. The Sixth Circuit's holding
en banc was almost identical to its earlier decision. See 6th Cir. Stands by Prior Deter-
minations on Parent Company Liability, ANDREWS HAZARDous WASTE LITIG. REP., May
19, 1997, at 32,296, 32,296 [hereinafter 6th Cir. Stands] (noting that "bulk of the
new majority [opinion] otherwise restated Cordova I's conclusions verbatim"). The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that MDNR was not liable as an
arranger. See Cordova Chemical, 59 F.3d at 591 (finding MDNR's good faith, but
unsuccessful, effort to address groundwater contamination problem was unfortu-
nate "but does not subject the agency to liability").
128. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 67 F.3d 586, 586 (6th Cir. 1995)
(noting that majority of court in regular active service voted for rehearing of case),
cert. granted sub nom., United States v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997). The
previous decision and judgment of the court was vacated. See id. ("'The effect of
the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to vacate the previous opinion and judg-
ment of this court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on the docket sheet
as a pending appeal."').
129. See Cordova Chemical 113 F.3d at 575.
130. See id. at 580. The court stated that:
[W] hether the parent will be liable as an operator depends upon whether
the degree to which it controls its subsidiary and the extent and manner
of its involvement with the facility, amount to the abuse of the corporate
form that will warrant piercing the corporate veil and disregarding the
separate corporate entities of the parent and subsidiary.
Id.
131. See id. at 577 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) and stating that
"[s]ection 107 (a) of CERCLA lists the parties who are potentially liable for the
cleanup costs of a polluted site").
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ous waste disposal.13 2
Next, the Sixth Circuit recognized that Congress intended CERCLA
to be a remedial statute, but found that the specific as opposed to the
general goals of Congress were difficult to discern.1 33 Therefore, the
Sixth Circuit found that courts are not justified in relying on CERCLA's
remedial nature as a basis for "filling in the blanks left by this sketchy
legislative history to impose liability under nearly every conceivable scena-
rio. 'q "4 On the contrary, the court proceeded to analyze the instant case
by adhering to the idea that courts should impose CERCIA liability only
on culpable parties who helped create the harmful conditions. 135
132. See id. There were no issues as to whether the Dalton Township property
was a "facility" within the meaning of the statute, whether it contained "hazardous
substances," that "releases" have occurred and threaten to occur and that CPC, the
MDNR, Aerojet, Cordova California and Cordova Michigan were all "persons"
under the statute. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549,
556 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (listing parties' stipulations before trial), affd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom., United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.) (en
banc), and cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997). Therefore, the only issue in dispute
was the appropriate standard for determining whether any of the parties qualified
as a present owner and operator of the facility or a prior owner or operator of the
facility. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 575.
133. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 578 (finding specific goals difficult to
"divine" because statute "represents an eleventh hour compromise" (citing New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039-42 (2d Cir. 1985)). The court
noted that "Congress enacted CERC[A as a 'remedial statute designed to protect
and preserve public health and the environment."' Id. at 577 (quoting United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990)). As a result, without
specific congressional intent to the contrary, "courts generally will not interpret
§ 9607(a) in a way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals." Id.
134. Id. at 578. CERCLA was an eleventh-hour compromise, enacted by a
lame-duck Congress. and President. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1040 (noting final
version of statute was compromise "put together" by sponsors of earlier versions of
bill). As a result, there is little legislative history that directly refers to the statute
and some of its provisions are vague. See id. (finding, however, that "the evolution
of the, [earlier] legislation provides useful guidance to Congress's intentions").
The Sixth Circuit stated that, although CERCLA is a remedial statute and "the
liability provisions concerning facility operators should be construed so that finan-
cial responsibility for cleanup operations falls upon those entities that contributed
to the environmental problem," courts are not justified in casting "the widest net
possible ... in order to snare those who are innocently or tangentially tied to the
facility at issue." Cordova Chemica 113 F.3d at 578. More appropriately, the court
found "'Congress intended that those responsible for disposal of chemical poisons
bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."'
Id. (quoting Anspec Co. v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1241-42 (6th Cir.
1991)).
135. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 578. The court's interpretation of CER-
CLA, requiring culpability for liability, seems to be directly opposed to the nearly
unanimous interpretation that the statute imposes strict liability. See, e.g., United
States v. Cello-Foil Prods., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[I]f the tortured
history of CERCLA litigation has taught us one lesson, it is that CERCLA is a strict
liability statute."); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992)
("CERCLA imposes strict liability."); Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 28 (stating that
"[u]nder this strict liability statute, all that it is necessary to prove" is that defend-
ant was one of enumerated potentially responsible parties); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d
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The Sixth Circuit then turned to the district court's conclusions. 136
The district court found that the "owned or operated" language in section
107(a) (2) forged a "new, middle ground" between broad CERCLA liability
and the tradition of limited liability for corporate parents.137 To accom-
modate both of these concepts, a parent corporation cannot be held liable
"simply because [it] has had involvement with its subsidiary in a manner
merely consistent with their investment relationship. Rather, a parent
at 1042 ("Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even
though an explicit provision for strict liability was not included in the
compromise.").
136. See Cordova Chemical 113 F.3d at 578.
137. See id. The district court reasoned that under CERCLA, liability could
attach to a parent corporation in two ways: (1) direct liability as an operator or (2)
indirect liability as an owner by piercing the corporate veil. See CPC International,
777 F. Supp. at 571-72. The district court relied on the liability language of CER-
C[A and found that although it was lacking in specificity, "the plain language of
CERCLA makes it unmistakably clear that direct liability may attach to parties
other than the actual owners of hazardous waste facilities." Id. at 572. The court
concluded that to find that the statute mandates actual ownership would be to
disregard the express owned or operated language of the statute, and therefore
"reading the statute to employ only traditional concepts of ownership and liability
through veil-piercing would require a court to ignore not only the statute's broadly
remedial intent, but also its explicit words." Id. After concluding that liability
could attach to a parent corporation if it "acted in a manner that constitutes opera-
tion of a facility," the district court then addressed what kind of activity is necessary
for liability to attach. See id. Accordingly, the court adopted a "middle ground"
standard, whereby a parent corporation is protected by limited liability as long as it
interacts with its subsidiary "in a manner merely consistent with their investment
relationship," but will be subject to direct liability if it "actually operate [s] the busi-
ness of its subsidiary." Id. at 573.
The district court's view comports with the views of many courts and commen-
tators who have interpreted this section of CERCLA. See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79
F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996) (balancing interests of limited liability and CERCLA
liability scheme in adopting actual control direct liability standard); Lansford-
Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993)
(finding that Congress expanded circumstances when parent corporation can be
liable and supporting adoption of direct liability standard); Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at
26 (finding that direct liability through actual control is supported by statute);
Gary Allen, Refining the Scope of CERCLA's Corporate Veil Piercing Remedy, 6 STAN.
ENvrL. L.J. 43, 51-52 (1987) (discussing ways CERCLA liability currently can attach
to parent corporations and asserting that to meet statute's goals, "categorical liabil-
ity" should be imposed on parent corporations); Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3,
at 426 (finding that, in enacting CERCLA, Congress intended that costs of reme-
dial actions shift from public to private parties, including parent corporations);
Liability of Parent Corporation, supra note 53, at 987-88 (stating that imposing direct
CERCLA liability on parent corporations is economically and legally favorable).
In the instant case, because CPC never actually owned the Dalton Township
property, it could not be directly liable as an owner. See CPC International, 777 F.
Supp. at 555 (noting that Ott II, wholly owned subsidiary of CPC International,
owned site). Therefore, liability could only attach indirectly through corporate
veil piercing, or directly, as an operator. See id. at 581. The Sixth Circuit noted
that for the district court to hold CPC liable as an operator, it "necessarily had to
hold CPC, as a parent corporation, accountable for the environmental conduct of
its wholly owned subsidiary corporation, Ott II." Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 579.
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must have actually operated the business of its subsidiary." 138 Applying
this standard, the district court concluded that CPC and Aerojet were lia-
ble as operators for the disposal of waste that occurred while their subsidi-
aries operated the Dalton Township site. 139
The Sixth Circuit took issue with the district court's new middle
ground between CERCLA liability and limited liability, finding it to be un-
supported by the statute.1 40 Specifically, CERCLA defines "owner or oper-
ator of an onshore facility" as "any person owning or operating such
facility. ' 141 When an owner conveys a facility to a state or local govern-
ment, however, the definition reads "'any person who owned, operated or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility' immediately" before the
transfer to the governmental authority. 14 2 Relying on the difference be-
tween the definitions, the Sixth Circuit concluded "that the drafters of the
statute distinguished an operator from a person who 'otherwise con-
trolled' a facility. ' 14 3 An example of an operator, according to the court,
is one hired by an owner to run the daily operations of a facility.1 44 A
parent corporation, however, that "actively participates in the affairs of its
subsidiary consistent with the restrictions imposed by traditional corpora-
tions law ... [does not] assume[ ] the role of operator."14 5
In addition, the Sixth Circuit found the district court's opinion un-
138. CPC International, 777 F. Supp. at 573. In essence, without actually saying
it, the district court adopted the actual control standard. See id.; see also Kayser-Roth,
910 F.2d at 27 ("To be an operator requires more than merely complete ownership
and the concomitant general authority or ability to control that comes with owner-
ship. At a minimum it requires active involvement in the activities of the
subsidiary.").
139. See CPC International, 777 F. Supp. at 581. Regarding CPC, the district
court held it liable because "the evidence shows active participation and control by
CPC in Ott II affairs both internally through the subsidiary's board and manage-
ment and externally through the policies of the development company and the
actions of individual CPC officials." Id. at 575. The court held Aerojet liable be-
cause it concluded that Aerojet "operated the site through active participation and
pervasive control over the businesses of both Cordova/California and Cordova/
Michigan." Id. at 580.
140. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 579. The court stated: "We are not
persuaded that, in enacting CERCLA, Congress contemplated the abandonment
of traditional concepts of limited liability associated with the corporate form in
favor of an undefined 'new, middle ground."' Id. Specifically, the court found the
district court's new middle ground threatened "the efficacy of time-honored lim-
ited liability protections afforded by the corporate form" without an express state-
ment by Congress that that was what it intended to do. Id. Agreeing with the Fifth
Circuit in Joslyn Manufacturing, the Sixth Circuit found that "' [i] f Congress wanted
to extend liability to parent corporations it could have done so, and it remains free
to do so."' Id. at 579-80 (alterations in original) (quoting Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L.
James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990)).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (ii) (1994).
142. Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 579 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (iii)).
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id.
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clear. 146 For example, in defining the scope of the new middle ground
standard, the Sixth Circuit noted that the district court used the phrases
"actual operation of the subsidiary's business" and "the exertion of power
or influence through active participation in the subsidiary's business" in-
terchangeably.1 47 The Sixth Circuit, however, found the concepts were
not interchangeable and that CPC would only have been liable under the
latter standard, "underscor[ing] the inevitable difficulty that arises when
courts attempt to erect new concepts of corporate liability within the
framework of CERCLA."
1 48
Finally, the Sixth Circuit found the district court's new, middle
ground to be problematic for two other reasons.1 49 First, the district
court's approach was "nebulous," while the traditional doctrine of pierc-
ing the corporate veil provides a "relatively bright line" for determining
parent liability.1 5 0 Second, the threat of unlimited corporate liability
would have a chilling effect on participation by outside parties in facility
remediation efforts.
15 1
Based on the reasons described above, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
district court's new middle ground and adopted a piercing the corporate
veil standard.1 52 Accordingly, under the circuit court's opinion:
[W] hether the parent will be liable as an operator depends upon
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The court posited a third standard, not mentioned in the district
court's opinion, in which CERCLA could impose liability on a parent corporation:
where the parent independently operates the facility "in the stead of its subsidiary,"
or in the case of a joint venturer, "alongside its subsidiary." Id.
149. See id. at 580.
150. See id. The court questioned how courts are to tell "[w]hen, precisely,
... a parent [is] acting in a manner consistent with its investment relationship as
opposed to a manner that triggers operator liability." Id. Although the district
court provided factors to guide courts in applying its standard, the Sixth Circuit
found them largely unhelpful. See id. ("The indicia enumerated by the district
court, such as participation in the subsidiary's board of directors and involvement
in specific policy decisions, offer little guidance."). Finally, the court noted that
"these activities are not grounds traditionally relied upon as warranting the disre-
gard of separate corporate existences." Id.
151. See id. The court found the instant case to be illustrative of its point, in
that MDNR sought a private sector investor to remediate the site, contracting with
Aerojet and the Cordova defendants. See id. The court found that "[t]o scuttle
such sensible and legitimate precautions in favor of an unpredictable 'control' test
would actually contravene the public interest by discouraging businesses from be-
ing involved in such projects." Id.
152. See id. The Sixth Circuit held:
[W]e reject the district court's "new, middle ground" as the basis for fix-
ing operator liability and hold that where a parent corporation is sought
to be held liable as an operator pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) based
upon the extent of its control of its subsidiary which owns the facility, the
parent will be liable only when the requirements necessary to pierce the
corporate veil are met.
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whether the degree to which it controls its subsidiary and the
extent and manner of its involvement with the facility, amount to
the abuse of the corporate form that will warrant piercing the
corporate veil and disregarding the separate corporate entities of
the parent and subsidiary. 153
The circuit court applied state law in determining whether it should
pierce the corporate veil and ultimately concluded that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to warrant the piercing. 154
The Sixth Circuit summarized its holding by saying that under section
107(a) (2) of CERCLA, there are three potential scenarios under which a
parent corporation could be liable as an operator: (1) under the standard
adopted by the circuit court as an owner by piercing the corporate veil; (2)
as an operator when the parent directly operates the facility itself; and (3)
under the new, middle ground standard adopted by the district court.' 55
The second liability scenario was not present in the instant case, and be-
cause the Sixth Circuit rejected the third scenario, the court concluded
that "traditional veil piercing is the only standard under which ... liability
can be assessed reliably."1 56 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's finding of operator liability with respect to CPC.157
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar result regarding Aerojet's opera-
tor liability.' 58 The court held that the veil piercing test was the appropri-
153. Id.
154. See id. at 580-81. Under Michigan law, two requirements must be met in
order to pierce: (1) "such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate per-
sonalities of the corporation and its owner cease to exist" and (2) "the circum-
stances must be such that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice." Id. at 580; see Bodenhamer Bldg.
Corp. v. Architectural Research Corp., 873 F.2d 109, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1989) (sur-
veying Michigan corporate veil piercing decisions); Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537
N.W.2d 221, 224 (Mich. 1995) (describing Michigan veil piercing law as requiring
both fraud and that parent had treated subsidiary as mere instrumentality). The
district court found there was sufficient evidence to hold CPC directly liable, but
the Sixth Circuit held this evidence was insufficient to pierce CPC's veil. See Cor-
dova Chemica4 113 F.3d at 581 (holding that 100% stock ownership, participation
in subsidiary's board of directors, "cross-pollination of officers," active participa-
tion by CPC in environmental matters and financial control were insufficient evi-
dence to warrant piercing). The Sixth Circuit's decision to apply state law in
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil is another contentious point of
this opinion, albeit outside of the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the ap-
propriate law to apply in this situation, see Jeanette M. Bowers, A Parent Corpora-
tion's Potential Liability for Acts of Its Dissolved Missouri Subsidiary Corporation, J. Mo.
B., May-June 1997, at 145, 148-49.
155. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 581.
156. Id. The Sixth Circuit failed to distinguish between "owner" and "opera-
tor" liability under CERCLA and it mistakenly used the terms interchangeably in
the summation of its holding. See id. (holding veil piercing was standard to ad-
judge owner liability and then reversing district court's finding of operator
liability).
157. See id.
158. See id. at 583.
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ate measure of liability, but that they would not pierce because there was
insufficient evidence. 159 Therefore, Aerojet was not held liable as an
operator.160
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Sixth Circuit held that a court must pierce the corporate veil in
order to attach operator liability to a parent corporation.1 6 1 This Note
suggests that the Sixth Circuit's conclusion was incorrect because it misin-
terpreted CERCLA and hindered the accomplishment of its remedial
goals. First, the court premised its decision on a misinterpretation that
CERCLA imposes liability only on culpable parties. 162 Second, the pierc-
ing the corporate veil standard severely hinders accomplishment of the
statute's remedial purpose.1 6 3 Third, the Sixth Circuit's holding does not
comport with the plain statutory language of CERCLA. 164 Fourth, con-
trary to the court's assertion, imposing direct liability on parent corpora-
tions will not deter private sector cleanups. 165 Fifth and finally, contrary
to the court's assertion, the standard adopted by the district court and a
majority of the other circuits will not result in confused interpretation of
CERCLA liability law. 166 Instead of adopting the piercing the corporate
veil standard for parent liability, the Sixth Circuit should have followed the
majority of circuits and adopted the actual control standard.1 67 The ac-
159. See id. at 582. The court considered such evidence as Aerojet's active
participation in the acquisition of the Dalton Township site, its total ownership of
the subsidiary, the timing of the incorporation of the subsidiaries, "cross-pollina-
tion" of corporate officers, financial control and the integration of the businesses.
See id.
160. See id. at 583.
161. See id. at 580.
162. See id. at 578. But see United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 28
(1st Cir. 1990) (noting CERCLA is strict liability statute). For a discussion of CER-
CLA's strict liability standard, see infra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of CERCLA's remedial purpose and why courts should
construe the statute liberally, see infra notes 183-209 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the proper interpretation of CERCLA's owned or op-
erated language, see infra notes 210-30 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of the economic ramifications of the direct liability stan-
dard, see infra notes 231-45 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the factors applied in the actual control test and their
relatively predictable result, see infra notes 246-65 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting
actual control standard, finding it compatible with statutory language and broad
remedial scheme); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d
417, 420 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding support in legislative history for adopting actual
control standard); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d
1209, 1220-21 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding "district court, by applying the 'actual con-
trol' test, applied the correct legal standard with respect to the operator liability
issue"); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir.
1993) (finding that in parent corporation context, "[t]he plain language of the
statute leads to the conclusion that a person is liable as an 'operator' when that
person actually supervises the activities of the facility. That is, the person must play
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tual control standard most closely resembles and effectuates the intent of
Congress in enacting CERCLA, as evidenced by the language of the statute
and its legislative history.168
A. CERCLA Imposes Strict Liability
In determining the appropriate standard for parent operator liability,
the Sixth Circuit premised its conclusion on the "tenet that liability at-
taches only to those parties who are culpable in the sense that they, by
some realistic measure, helped to create the harmful conditions" at a facil-
ity.169 The term culpable is defined as "at fault.' 7 0 Other courts, how-
ever, consistently interpret CERCLA as imposing strict liability or liability
without regard to the fault of the party.171
an active role in the actual management of the enterprise."); Riverside Mkt. Dev.
Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing majority shareholders cannot "hid[e] behind the corporate shield when, as
'operators,' they themselves actually participate in the wrongful conduct prohib-
ited by [CERCLA]"); Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (interpreting statute to support
imposition of liability on parent corporation when it is actively involved in subsidi-
ary's activities).
168. For a discussion of the plain language of CERCLA as support for the
actual control standard, see infra notes 210-30 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of CERCLA's legislative history as support for the actual control standard,
see infra notes 183-209 and accompanying text.
169. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 578 (6th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997).
170. BIAcxs's LAw DIcrIoNARY 379 (6th ed. 1990). Strict liability is liability
without fault and in the CERCLA context, it is "liability without fault for releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances." Stewart & Campbell, supra note 28,
at 7; see Sandvos, supra note 9, at 869 (finding liability attaches to parties defined in
statute without regard to fault).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th
Cir. 1996) ("[I]f the tortured history of CERCLA litigation has taught us one les-
son, it is that CERCLA is a strict liability statute."); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) ("CERCLA imposes strict liability."); Kayser-
Roth, 910 F.2d at 28 (stating that "[u]nder this strict liability statute, all that it is
necessary to prove" is that defendant was owner or one of enumerated potentially
responsible parties); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir.
1985) (discussing reasons why CERCLA is strict liability statute); Idylwoods Assocs.
v. Mader Capital, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 410, 412 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that CER-
CLA imposes strict liability for costs of hazardous substance releases). One com-
mentator noted:
Although CERCLA does not state explicitly a scheme of liability, courts
consistently have interpreted CERCLA as creating strict, joint and several
liability. Thus, without regard for notions of intent or fault, full liability
for all cleanup costs extends to any person falling in one of the four cate-
gories of responsible parties.
Sandvos, supra note 9, at 869. In addition, courts are mindful of the fact that strict
liability will sometimes impose financial responsibility on a party that is the least
responsible for the waste disposal, which the statute intended. See Idylwoods, 956 F.
Supp. at 417-18 (noting effects of CERCLA's strict liability regime). The Idylwoods
court stated: "'CERCLA envisions that sometimes the cleanup must be paid for by
those least responsible because those who are most responsible lack funds or can-
not be found. It tempers its severity with an apportionment principle and with
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Although CERCLA does not expressly impose strict liability, there is
evidence in the statute and its legislative history that supports the nearly
unanimous interpretation that CERCLA liability is strict.17 2 First, section
9601(32) of the statute defines the terms "liable" and "liability" as the
same standard of liability as under 33 U.S.C. § 1321, the Clean Water
Act.173 Courts have consistently construed the Clean Water Act as impos-
ing strict liability.' 74 Therefore, in accordance with the statutory defini-
tion, liability is strict under CERCLA. 1
75
Second, the legislative history of CERCLA clearly indicates that Con-
gress intended liability to be strict.176 Prior to passage, there were differ-
limited defenses that are rarely available.'" Id. at 418 (quoting Lincoln Properties,
Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1537 (E.D. Cal. 1992)); see H.R. REP. No. 99-
253, pt. 3, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3038 (finding that
CERCLA liability is strict and "may be imposed without fault, and each responsible
party may be held liable for the entire cost of cleanup, even if that party's contribu-
tion to the waste site was minimal"). In 1989, the Sixth Circuit even recognized
that "' [t]he plain language of section 9607(a) (2) extends liability to owners of
waste facilities regardless of their degree of participation in the subsequent dispo-
sal of hazardous waste.'" United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507
(6th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th
Cir. 1988)). Therefore, in Cordova Chemical, the Sixth Circuit contradicted its prior
holding by requiring culpability for CERCLA liability. See Cordova Chemica4 113
F.3d at 578 (adhering to "tenet" that culpability is required for CERCLA liability).
The imposition of strict liability also comports with the goals of CERCLA, as
well as its remedial nature. See Idylwoods, 956 F. Supp. at 418 (noting that "'a CER-
CLA regime which rewards indifference to environmental hazards and discourages
voluntary efforts at waste cleanup [could] not be what Congress had in mind'" in
enacting the statute (quoting Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966
F.2d 837, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1992))). In this regard, by imposing strict liability, Con-
gress encouraged an active approach to environmental hazards and waste cleanup,
thereby effectuating the statute's purpose of remediating hazardous waste sites. See
Stewart & Campbell, supra note 28, at 8 (finding that liability scheme under CER-
CLA encourages firms to be proactive in investigating environmental practices at
site and in abating environmental harm).
172. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 ("Congress intended that responsible
parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability
was not included in the compromise."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1994) (pro-
viding definition of "liable" and "liability"); S. REP. No. 96-848, at 34 (1980).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (32) (stating that "liability" is to be "construed to be
the standard of liability which obtains under" Clean Water Act); see also Shore Realty,
759 F.2d at 1042 (noting CERCLA's definition of "liability" is same as Clean Water
Act).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that "[u]npermitted discharge is the archetypal Clean Water Act violation, and
subjects the discharger to strict liability'" (quoting United States v. Pozsgai, 999
F.2d 719, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1993))); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 (stating that courts
have held standard of liability under Clean Water Act to be strict); Steuart Transp.
Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding that final
version of statute included strict liability scheme).
175. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 (interpreting statutory definition of "lia-
bility" to mean strict liability).
176. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (stating
that "the standard of liability is intended to be the same as that provided in section
311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. I understand this to be a standard
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ent versions of CERCLA in the House and Senate, both of which expressly
provided for strict, joint and several liability. 177 As part of the compro-
mise in drafting the final version of the statute, however, CERCLA's spon-
sors replaced the express strict liability language with the reference to the
Clean Water Act. 178 Nonetheless, Congress still understood CERCILA to
impose strict liability. 179 For example, Representative Florio, one of the
sponsors of the compromise version of the bill, stated that although "[t] he
liability provisions of this bill do not refer to the term[ ] strict... liability,
... the strict liability standard... is preserved." 180 Therefore, it is appar-
ent that the tenet underlying the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cordova Chemi-
cal was incorrect, and therefore, the remainder of the opinion, which
relies upon this tenet, is likewise incorrect.' 8 1
of strict liability."). Both sponsors of the compromise bill expressly stated that
CERCLA imposes strict liability. See id. (statement of Sen. Randolph) (stating that
strict liability, by reference to Clean Water Act, is retained in compromise bill); id.
at 31,965 (statement of Rep. Florio) (stressing that liability under CERCLA is strict,
although statute does not expressly state such). The DOJ concurred in the under-
standing that CERCLA liability was intended to be strict. See id. at 778 (stating
liability under Clean Water Act was strict liability). The Senate also recognized the
strict liability standard of section 311 created strict CERCLA liability. See id. at 735
(statement of Sen. Dole) ("It also makes sense to incorporate a definition of strict
liability that will serve as a uniform standard in determining liability for cleanup
and other costs, and this has been achieved by reference to the Clean Water Act.");
id. at 740 (statement of Sen. Culver) ("The committee bill ... makes those who
release hazardous substances strictly liable for cleanup costs, mitigation and third-
party damages. Thus, it assures that the costs of chemical poison releases are
borne by those responsible for the releases.").
177. See S. 1480, 96th Cong. § 4(a) (1980) (stating that except when person
otherwise liable can establish defense, owner, operator, arranger or transporter
"shall be jointly, severally, and strictly liable" for remediation costs); H.R. 7020,
96th Cong. § 3071 (a) (1) (D) (1980) (providing that except for certain defenses,
"any person who caused or contributed to the release or threatened release shall
be [strictly] liable for such costs [and] . . . such liability shall be joint and several
with any other person who caused or contributed to such release").
178. See 126 CONG. Ric. 30,932 (statement of Sen. Randolph) ("We have kept
strict liability in the compromise, specifying the standard of liability under section
311 of the Clean Water Act .... ); 126 CONG. REc. 31,965 (statement of Rep.
Florio) (noting that drafters replaced strict liability language with reference to
Clean Water Act, but "despite the absence of these specific terms, the strict liability
standard . . . is preserved").
179. See S. ReP. No. 96-848, at 34 (1980) (noting that strict liability scheme is
established under statute); see also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 (stating that Con-
gress understood liability under CERCLA to be strict).
180. 126 CONG. REc. 31,965 (statement of Rep. Florio).
181. Compare United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 578 (6th
Cir.) (en banc) (adhering to tenet "that liability attaches only to those parties who
are culpable in the sense that they, by some realistic measure, helped to create the
harmful conditions"), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997), with 126 CONG. REC.
30,932 (statement of Sen. Randolph) (stating that by "specifying the standard of
liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act," statute retained strict liability),
and Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 ("Congress intended that responsible parties be
held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability was not in-
cluded in the compromise.").
266 [Vol. 43: p. 219
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B. Courts Must Construe Remedial Statutes Liberally
In addition, the piercing the corporate veil standard for operator lia-
bility that the Sixth Circuit adopted frustrates the congressional goals of
CERCLA. Congress enacted CERCLA as a remedial statute with two pri-
mary goals: (1) to provide for the cleanup of hazardous substances and
(2) to hold responsible parties financially liable for the cleanups.18 2
As a basic principle of statutory construction, courts should liberally
construe remedial statutes.' 8 3 This liberal construction allows courts to
"effectuate the remedial purpose for which (the statute] was enacted."18 4
Under a liberal construction, courts can extend the language of the stat-
ute "to include matters within the spirit or purpose" of the statute to effec-
tuate its intent. 18 5 Courts, however, must be reasonable in liberally
construing statutes "in order to stay within the prerogatives of the
legislature."1
8 6
When courts apply these principles to CERCLA interpretation, it is
clear that they should liberally construe the statute to effectuate its
goals.' 8 7 Accordingly, courts can extend the statute to matters that,
although not expressly stated, are within the "spirit or purpose" of the
statute.' 8 8 The Sixth Circuit, however, failed to adhere to this principle by
refusing to recognize the broad range of liability intended by the defini-
182. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3038 (listing goals of CERCLA as cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances at expense of responsible parties); Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 14
(characterizing goal of cleanup of hazardous substances at responsible parties' ex-
pense as "Congress's fundamental purpose[ I] in enacting CERCLA").
183. See ENDLIcH, supra note 29, § 107, at 141 (stating that most liberal statu-
tory construction is given to remedial statutes); 3 SINGER, supra note 29, § 60.01, at
55 (stating that liberal construction is necessary "to suppress the evil and advance
the remedy" of remedial statutes). In a statutory construction analysis, "[m]uch
... depend[s] on whether a statute is characterized as remedial or as one which is
penal or in derogation of the common law." Id. Courts uniformly characterize
CERCLA as remedial. See, e.g., Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996)
(noting Congress enacted CERCLA with expansive, remedial purpose).
184. 3 SINGER, supra note 29, § 60.01, at 55; see ENDLIcH, supra note 29, § 107,
at 142 (finding courts are to liberally construe remedial statutes "to carry out the
purpose of the enactment, suppress the mischief and advance the remedy contem-
plated by the Legislature").
185. 2A SINGER, supra note 29, § 58.06, at 723; see ENDLICH, supra note 29,
§ 110, at 144 ("Sometimes the governing principle of the remedial enactment has
been extended to cases not included in its language, to prevent a failure ofjustice,
and consequently of the probable intention.").
186. 3 SINGER, supra note 29, § 60.01, at 55; see ENDLICH, supra note 29, § 110,
at 146 (stating that extending interpretation beyond words of statute does not ap-
ply when statute is "too explicit" to warrant such extension).
187. See Russo, supra note 28, at 157 (" [C] ourts consider CERCLA a remedial
statute, and therefore, construe it liberally to effectuate its goals, particularly the
goal of responsible parties bearing the cost of cleanup.").
188. See 2A SINGER, supra note 29, § 58.06, at 723 (noting that "a statute is
liberally construed when its letter is extended to include matters within the spirit
or purpose of the statute").
19981
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tion of "owner or operator."'18 9
CERCLA defines an "owner or operator" as "any person owning or
operating such facility." 190 The statute defines "person" as "an individual,
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture,
commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, com-
mission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."' 9 1 Courts
interpret these definitions as indicative of the types of parties that can be
owners or operators, rather than as an exhaustive list.192 For example, the
Second Circuit, in Schiavone interpreted the word "person" to include par-
ent corporations, which provided "additional justification" for including a
parent corporation as an operator under CERCLA. 195 The court adopted
the rationale of the Third Circuit and stated: "'CERCLA's language, there-
fore, indicates an intent to hold a corporation liable for the environmen-
tal violations of its subsidiaries . . . if it is otherwise determined to have
operated the facility in question."'14
In determining the appropriate standard to adopt, the Schiavone court
also considered the piercing the corporate veil approach, which the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits followed, noting that "'[s]ignificantly, CERCLA does
not define 'owners' or 'operators' as including the parent company of of-
fending wholly-owned subsidiaries. "195 Although the court was "not un-
mindful of the weighty concerns expressed by the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits," it chose the actual control standard, finding it "consistent with
CERCLA's broad remedial scheme." 196 Consequently, it is both reason-
able and within the purpose of CERCIA to include parent corporations in
the definition of "owner or operator" and, therefore, to consider them
189. See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding
remedial construction of statute, in light of legislative purpose, supports character-
ization of parent corporations as owners or operators); Lansford-Coaldale Joint
Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1219-21 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing
whether parent corporation qualifies as "covered person" in that it is owner or
operator under CERCLA);John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 404-
05 (1st Cir. 1993) (recognizing other courts broadly interpret CERCLA "owned or
operated" language to include successor and parent corporations); United States
v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 n.5 (1st Cir. 1990) (characterizing statutory
definition of person as extremely broad, indicating parent corporation can be
owner or operator).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (ii) (1994).
191. Id. § 9601(21).
192. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 n.l1 (indicating person includes "a
firm, corporation, or commercial entity, among other things"). The Third Circuit
determined that "other things," beyond those listed in the statute, were included
as persons. Id. By expanding the definition of person beyond the express lan-
guage, the court found that CERCLA's list of potential owners or operators was not
exhaustive. See id.
193. See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 255.
194. Id. (quoting Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 n.11).
195. Id. (quotingJoslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82-83 (5th
Cir. 1990)).
196. Id.
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potentially directly liable. 19 7 The Sixth Circuit, however, misinterpreted
the remedial nature of the statute by holding that a parent corporation
could only be indirectly liable.' 98
By imposing liability on parent corporations under a piercing the cor-
porate veil standard, the Sixth Circuit also frustrated Congress' intent in
enacting CERCLA. 199 The Sixth Circuit's piercing test adheres to tradi-
tional rules of limited corporate liability. 200 There is some evidence, how-
197. See id. at 253 ("An interpretation of CERCLA that imposes operator lia-
bility directly on parent corporations whose own acts violate the statute is consis-
tent with the general thrust and purpose of the legislation."); see also Lansford-
Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 n.11 (noting broad definition of person indicates intent to
hold parent corporations liable);John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401,
405 (lst Cir. 1993) (finding parent corporations among list of potentially responsi-
ble parties, reflecting "CERCLA's 'essential purpose' of making 'those responsible
for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and respon-
sibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."' (quoting Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)));
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding legisla-
tive history to indicate intent to impose liability on "'classes of persons without
reference to whether they caused or contributed to the release or threat of re-
lease'" and concluding that it "reveals no reason why a parent corporation cannot
be held liable as an operator under CERCLA" (quoting New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985))).
198. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir.) (en
banc) (omitting any discussion of broad definition of person), cert. granted, 118 S.
Ct. 621 (1997). In fact, the Sixth Circuit did not even have to address the issue of
whether a parent corporation is a person within the meaning of the statute be-
cause the parties previously stipulated to the fact that they were all persons within
the definition of CERCLA. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F.
Supp. 549, 556 (W.D. Mich. 1991) ("The parties have stipulated . . .that CPC,
MDNR, Aerojet, Cordova/California and Cordova/Michigan are 'persons,' as de-
fined under CERCLA's relevant provisions."), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.) (en banc), and cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997). On the contrary, the court was free to include par-
ent corporations in the definition of owner or operator. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)
(1994) (noting that "[t]he term 'owner or operator' means.., any person owning
or operating" facility). Rather than construing the statute with its remedial pur-
poses in mind, the Sixth Circuit concentrated on a different definition of "owned
or operated" provided by CERCLA. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 579 (contrast-
ing usual "owner or operator" definition with definition when facility has been
conveyed to state or local government). When someone conveys a facility to the
government, an "owner or operator" of a facility that has been conveyed to the
government is one who "owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such
facility immediately" before the owner transferred the property. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (20) (A) (iii). The court found that because Congress included a control test
in this definition and not the other, the drafters distinguished between those that
controlled the facility and those that operated it. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at
579 ("It thus appears that the drafters of the statute distinguished an operator
from a person who 'otherwise controlled' a facility."). This conclusion is called
into doubt, however, by the court's own hypothetical that designates a party hired
to run the "daily ... operation" of a facility, presumably to control the facility's
operations, an "operator." Id.
199. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 (noting congressional intent to make
responsible parties pay for cleanups).
200. See Cordova Chemical 113 F.3d at 580 (holding that liability will depend
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ever, which indicates that Congress intended to expand parent liability for
a subsidiary's activities beyond traditional limited liability principles. 20 1
For example, the Third Circuit, relying on CERCLA's language, found
that "Congress has expanded the circumstances under which a corpora-
tion may be held liable for the acts of an affiliated corporation such that,
when a corporation is determined to be the operator of a subsidiary...
corporation, traditional rules of limited liability for corporations do not
apply.-"202
In support of its adoption of the piercing the corporate veil test, the
Sixth Circuit found that the specific goals of CERCLA were difficult to
discern and that courts cannot use the remedial nature of the statute "as a
reason for filling in the blanks left by this sketchy legislative history [in
order] to impose liability under nearly every conceivable scenario."20 3 It is
generally accepted that courts must not go beyond "reasonable bounds" in
liberally construing a statute. 20 4 There is evidence, however, that Con-
gress intended the courts "to develop a federal common law to supple-
ment the statute."20 5 For example, during the debates on CERCLA,
Representative Florio stated, "[t]o insure the development of a uniform
rule of law, and to discourage business[es] dealing in hazardous sub-
stances from locating primarily in States with more lenient laws, the bill
on whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant piercing corporate veil). Under
traditional rules of limited liability, a parent corporation typically is not liable for
the debts and obligations of its subsidiary. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 25,
at 513 (stating that corporations are distinct entities with different rights and liabil-
ities than their shareholders). Despite their separate existence, however, courts
will pierce the corporate veil when it is in the interests of justice. See id. § 41, at
602-03 (finding practically all authorities agree courts may disregard corporate
separateness in cases of fraud, contravention of law or contract or public wrong).
201. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 (interpreting liability under statute
to extend beyond limited liability); see also Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 253 (finding that
there is "perceived tension between direct liability and liability based on veil pierc-
ing," but imposing operator liability directly on parent corporations "is consistent
with the general thrust and purpose of the legislation"); Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp.
v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that
under traditional concepts of corporate law, shareholder would be protected from
liability for acts of valid corporation, "[h]owever, CERCLA prevents individuals
from hiding behind the corporate shield when, as 'operators,' they themselves ac-
tually participate in the wrongful conduct prohibited by the Act").
202. Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221. The court noted the broad language of
CERC[A supported the view that "notwithstanding the traditional rule of limited
liability in the corporate context," parent corporations could be directly liable. Id.
at 1221 n.l. The court relied on the definitions of operator and person, finding
they indicate an intent to hold parent corporations liable if they are "determined
to have operated the facility." Id.
203. Cordova Chemica4 113 F.3d at 578.
204. See ENDLICH, supra note 29, § 110, at 146 (finding limits to principle that
courts can extend statute beyond express language); 3 SINGER, supra note 29,
§ 60.01, at 55 (explaining that courts must stay within prerogatives of legislature).
205. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 347 (D.N.J. 1991)
(quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d
Cir. 1988)).
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will encourage the further development of a Federal common law" regard-
ing CERCLA.20 6 Therefore, it is apparent that to impose direct liability on
a parent corporation that actively participates in its subsidiary's business
operations comports with CERCLA's remedial purpose.20 7 In addition, it
is equally apparent that the Sixth Circuit's more stringent piercing the
corporate veil standard conflicts with remedial statutory construction prin-
ciples and hinders Congress' goals in enacting the statute.20 8
C. Statutory Language Supports Direct Liability Standard
In addition to erroneously imposing a culpability requirement in
CERCLA and hindering its congressional goals, the Sixth Circuit also mis-
interpreted the plain language of the statute.2 0 9 Liability under CERCLA
attaches if a party owned or operated a facility at the time a release or
threatened release of hazardous materials occurred.2 10 The statute de-
fines "owner or operator" as "any person owning or operating such facil-
ity." 2 1 Although the definition is not very helpful in determining the
exact meaning of the words "owner or operator," the use of "or" implies
that owners and operators are two separate classes of liable parties under
the statute. 212
The First Circuit in Kayser-Roth was one of the first appellate courts to
206. 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio).
207. See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996) ("An interpreta-
tion of CERCLA that imposes operator liability directly on parent corporations
whose own acts violate the statute is consistent with the general thrust and purpose
of the legislation."); Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 n.11 (adopting actual control
standard because statute's language "indicates an intent to hold a corporation lia-
ble ... if it is otherwise determined to have operated the facility in question").
208. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221 (construing CERCLA broadly and
finding that Congress intended to expand liability under statute so that "tradi-
tional rules of limited liability for corporations do not apply").
209. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) (1994) (stating that any person who
owned or operated facility is liable), with United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113
F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (stating that owner liability attaches with veil
piercing, and as result, parent not liable as operator because veil piercing was not
warranted), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997).
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) (stating that any person who "owned or oper-
ated ... facility" at time hazardous substances were disposed of shall be liable for
remediation costs).
211. Id. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
212. See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 254 ("Observing that 'owner' liability and 'opera-
tor' liability denote two separate concepts, courts stress the disjunctive character of
CERCLA liability."); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d
417, 421 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding owners and operators to be separate kinds of
liable parties); Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1220 (noting there is general agreement
that "'owner' liability and 'operator' liability denote two separate concepts" of lia-
bility); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Con-
gress, by including a liability category in addition to owner ('operators') connected
by the conjunction 'or,' implied that a person who is an operator of a facility is not
protected from liability by the legal structure of ownership.").
1998]
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consider the issue of owner or operator liability.213 The court began its
analysis of whether a parent corporation could be directly liable as an op-
erator by looking at the grammatical construction of the statute.2 14 The
court found it significant that CERCLA imposes liability on one who
owned or operated a facility. 215 On the basis of this language, the court
concluded that "Congress, by including a liability category in addition to
owner ('operators') connected by the conjunction 'or,' implied that a per-
son who is an operator of a facility is not protected from liability by the
legal structure of ownership."2 1 6
The Sixth Circuit, however, failed to distinguish between an owner
and an operator, using the terms seemingly interchangeably.2 1 7 For ex-
ample, when the court summarized its holding concerning the liability of
CPC, it stated one possible liability scenario was "as an owner, by piercing
the corporate veil."2 1 8 Later, however, after concluding that the veil pierc-
ing standard was the only reliable measure of liability, the court stated it
must reverse "the district court's finding of operator liability" regarding
CPC. 2 1 9
The Sixth Circuit's failure to distinguish between an owner and an
operator is significant because there are two separate standards of liability
for owners and operators. 220 The United States District Court of Rhode
Island addressed the issue of parent corporation operator liability:
Ordinarily, a parent corporation cannot be deemed an operator
based solely upon its status as a shareholder. The fact that a sub-
sidiary was a member of the classes of persons potentially liable
213. See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 24 (noting that case was decided August 2,
1990).
214. See id. at 26 (examining definitions and language of CERCLA).
215. See id.
216. Id. The Third Circuit in Lansford-Coaldale, adopted the First Circuit's in-
terpretation, finding that "[t]here is general agreement that under CERCLA,
'owner' liability and 'operator' liability denote two separate concepts." Lansford-
Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1220.
217. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir.) (en
banc) (holding piercing corporate veil could result in owner liability, then declin-
ing to hold defendant liable as operator under same standard), cert. granted, 118 S.
Ct. 621 (1997). At first glance, it appears that the Sixth Circuit recognized a differ-
ence between owners and operators in that the structure of its analysis seems to
distinguish between the two. See id. at 582-83 (using different owner and operator
liability analysis for Aerojet and its subsidiaries). In adjudging CPC's liability, how-
ever, the court did not distinguish between owner and operator liability. See id.
First, the structure of the court's analysis does not differentiate the two standards;
instead, the court deals with CPC's owner or operator liability in the same section.
See id. at 578-81. Second, in assessing CPC's liability, the court uses the terms
"owner" and "operator" seemingly interchangeably. See id. at 581.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1220 (noting that separate concepts of
owner and operator liability "require two separate standards for determining
whether they apply").
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under CERCLA and that the parent had a substantial ownership
interest in the subsidiary is insufficient to establish that the par-
ent was an operator for CERCLA's purposes.2 2 1
Rather, operator liability is a question of the degree of control that the
parent corporation exercised over the subsidiary's operations, manage-
ment and environmental policies. 222
Conversely, owner liability is literally imposed on the party that is
deemed to have owned the contaminated facility.2 2 3 Generally, an owner
is the party that holds title to the contaminated site.22 4 A parent corpora-
tion, however, while not actually holding title to a facility, can be held
liable as an owner because "[i]mputing CERCLA liability upon a parent
corporation by piercing the corporate veil is, in essence, concluding that
the parent is an owner for CERCLA's purposes."2 25 Therefore, in most
cases, an owner may be an operator if it exercises the requisite degree of
221. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22 (D.R.I. 1989),
affd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
222. See id. ("Kayser-Roth's liability as an operator turns on the issue of con-
trol."). The court found it "uncontroverted" that the subsidiary was within the
class of potentially liable parties under CERCLA and that Kayser-Roth, "as sole
owner and shareholder" of Stamina Mills, the subsidiary, "had a substantial finan-
cial and ownership interest" in the subsidiary. Id. Therefore, "[t]he question be-
comes whether Kayser-Roth exercised control over Stamina Mills management and
operations sufficient to find that Kayser-Roth was a de facto operator." Id. The
court then discussed a number of factors that it relied on in holding Kayser-Roth
directly liable as an operator. See id.
223. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1225 (noting that owner liability can at-
tach only if defendant "meets the common definition of that term").
224. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1105 (6th ed. 1990) (defining owner as
"[t]he person in whom legal title is vested the ownership, dominion, or title of
property"). The Third Circuit addressed the owner liability issue for a parent
corporation:
[W]hile Congress has provided little guidance in CERCLA as to the ap-
propriate standard governing owner liability .... it is nonetheless clear
that owner liability can ordinarily only attach if the defendant meets the
common definition of that term and is at least a partial owner of the
corporation responsible for the substantive CERCLA offenses. Thus, in
contrast to operator liability, corporate ownership is generally a pre-req-
uisite for this status to apply ....
Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1225.
225. Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 23. A corporation is regarded as an entity
separate from its shareholders. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 25, at 512. As a
result of the corporation's entity status, it can own property in its own name. See
CooK, supra note 6, at 18 (noting corporations have power to purchase and hold
land and chattels); FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 25, at 512 (finding corporation
capable of "possessing and owning real and personal property in its own name");
HENN, supra note 3, § 78, at 89 (stating one attribute of modem corporation is
power to "take, hold, and convey property in the corporate name"). When courts
pierce the corporate veil, however, the court disregards the separateness of the
corporation and its shareholders, and treats them as the same entity. See FLETCHER
ET AL., supra note 3, § 41, at 603. Therefore, when a court pierces a corporation's
corporate veil, the court considers the owners of the corporation as the owners of
the corporation's property. See id.
1998] NOTE
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control over the facility, but an operator will not necessarily be an
owner.226 As such, courts cannot appropriately impose the same standard
of liability on parent corporations in determining both owner and opera-
tor liability.22 7 The Sixth Circuit, then, by failing to distinguish between
owners and operators, inappropriately collapsed the standard for adjudg-
ing parent corporation liability into the more stringent piercing the corpo-
rate veil standard. 228 Because the premise for the Sixth Circuit's holding
was a misinterpretation of the plain language of the statute and the stan-
dard that it adopted fails to recognize the two classes of liable parties in-
tended by CERCIA, the court's holding is questionable. 229
D. Direct Parental Liability Will Not Have a Chilling Effect on Facility
Remediation
The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's direct liability standard
for parent corporation liability in part because it feared "the threat of un-
limited liability [would] . . . deter private sector participation in the
cleanup of existing sites." 230  The circuit court's concern is unwar-
ranted. 23 1 Recent developments in environmental law limit the potential
liability of prospective purchasers of contaminated sites, as well as the
lenders financing those purchases.23 2
226. See Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 23 ("While an owner may be, in most
cases, an operator, the converse is not necessarily true.").
227. See id. (finding two classes of liable parties that can, but do not have to
include similar parties). It necessarily follows that for there to be two classes of
liable parties, there must also be two standards for determining who qualifies as a
member of each class. See id. at 22-23 (applying piercing corporate veil standard
for owner liability and actual control standard for operator liability).
228. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1220 (discussing appropriate liability stan-
dards for owner liability and operator liability). The court stated:
Under CERCLA, a corporation may be held liable as an owner for the
actions of its subsidiary corporation in situations in which it is determined
that piercing the corporate veil is warranted .... Operator liability, in
contrast, is generally reserved for those situations in which a parent or
sister corporation is deemed, due to the specifics of its relationship with
its affiliated corporation, to have had substantial control over the facility
in question.
Id.
229. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) (1994) (imposing liability on two
classes-owners and operators), with United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d
572, 581 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (interpreting CERCLA to impose liability on owner
or operator as same class of responsible parties), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997).
230. Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 580.
231. For a discussion of how investment will not be deterred, including an
example of private sector participation in a jurisdiction imposing direct parent
operator liability, see infra notes 233-44 and accompanying text.
232. See Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with
Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Pur-
chaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (E.P.A. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 EPA Gui-
dance] (announcing prospective purchaser agreements and providing guidance
thereon); see also Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at 42 U.S.C. M. 6991b(h), 9601(20), 9607 (1994
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In 1995, the EPA announced the "Brownfields Action Agenda," which
included several initiatives designed to promote the redevelopment of
abandoned, contaminated sites, otherwise known as brownfields. 2 3 As a
part of the agenda, the EPA clarified and encouraged the use of the pro-
& Supp. 1997)) (amending CERCLA by limiting liability of lenders for cleanup
costs).
233. See 1995 EPA Guidance, supra note 232, at 34,792-98 (listing initiatives
designed to remove "liability barriers" that hinder brownfields redevelopment).
By definition, "brownfields" are "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial or
commercial sites that are not being expanded or developed because of real or
perceived environmental contamination." Robert W. Wells, Jr., Brownfields for Be-
ginners, FLA. B.J., May 1997, at 74, 74. Although these sites are not contaminated
enough to be included on CERCLA's National Priority List, before the EPA's initia-
tive, purchasers of these sites were still potentially subject to Section 107(a) liabil-
ity. See id. at 74 n.9 (noting that brownfields sites are not so contaminated as to be
on National Priorities List, but subsequent purchaser of property could be liable as
owner); see also Margaret Murphy, Brownfields Sites: Removing Lender Concerns as a
Barrier to Redevelopment, 113 BANKING L.J. 440, 442-43 (1996) (discussing effect of
this potential liability on purchasers). One commentator noted:
By [statutory] definition, . . . brownfields are not sufficiently contami-
nated to merit ranking on the National Priorities List, [but] . . .
[p]otential purchasers ... are reluctant to buy brownfields because of
strict federal and state cleanup liability laws such as Superfund that can
potentially impose cleanup liability on owners of brownfields regardless
of whether they contributed to the contamination.
Id. In contrast to brownfields are "greenfields." Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and
the Evolution of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 265, 273 (1997).
Greenfields are previously unused properties, in which the potential for hazardous
waste contamination is slight. See id.
The EPA's brownfields agenda consists of five initiatives. See Murphy, supra, at
453-54. First, the EPA deleted approximately 24,000 sites from the National Priori-
ties List to "remove the stigma of potential environmental liability accompanying
the listing of these sites and to encourage redevelopment." Grant R. Trigger et al.,
Making Brownfields Green Again: How Efforts to Give Urban Centers an Economic Facelift
Have Changed the Face of Environmental Policy, MICH. B.J., Jan. 1997, at 42, 43; see
Murphy, supra, at 453-54 (noting concerns of lenders with "specter of federal liabil-
ity associated with properties" suspected of contamination and hesitancy of lenders
to lend for their development). One commentator stated:
One key concern of lenders is the specter of federal liability associated
with properties where there is suspected contamination. Because the
mere listing of a site on the Superfund tracking list is enough to deter
some lenders, the removal of sites from CERCLIS [the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information Sys-
tem] should help to alleviate some of these fears.
Id. Second, the EPA announced its intention to fund 50 brownfield pilot pro-
grams nationwide at up to $200,000 each. See id. at 454-55 ("EPA hopes to develop
a nationwide plan of action based on what it learns from conducting these
projects."). Third, the EPA issued guidance on prospective purchaser agreements
(PPAs), specifying the conditions under which the EPA would enter into such an
agreement. See id. at 455. Fourth, the EPA attempted to exclude lenders from
cleanup liability. See id. at 456. Congress codified this rule in the Asset Conserva-
tion, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6991b(h), 9601(20), 9607 (1994 & Supp. 1997), which amended the lender
liability provisions of CERCLA. Finally, the EPA delegated some parts of the CER-
CLA program to the states. See Murphy, supra, at 459.
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spective purchaser agreement (PPA). 234 A PPA is an agreement negoti-
ated between the EPA and a purchaser, whereby the EPA covenants not to
sue the prospective purchaser of a contaminated site, in exchange for a
"public benefit," usually in the form of financial or in-kind assistance with
the cleanup.23 5 Accordingly, through the use of PPAs, companies can
purchase and remediate contaminated property without fear of unlimited
CERCLA liability and a rule imposing direct liability on parent corpora-
tions will not deter private sector investment in cleanups. 236
234. See Murphy, supra note 233, at 455-56 (stating that EPA issued "guidance"
on PPAs). The guidance established four criteria to determine the appropriate-
ness of a PPA:
1) Enforcement action is anticipated by EPA; 2) A direct cleanup benefit
or indirect economic benefit will occur; 3) The operation of the site will
not aggravate or contribute to contamination, or pose health risk[s] to
the community or persons likely to be present at the site; and 4) The
prospective purchaser is a financially viable party.
Id. Although PPAs are included in the EPA's brownfields agenda, the fact that
anticipated enforcement action by the EPA is a prerequisite to a PPA indicates that
they can be used at sites on the National Priorities List, in addition to true
brownfields. Cf id. at 243 n.6, 454-56 (noting that EPA initiates CERCLA enforce-
ment action primarily from National Priorities List). The EPA previously intro-
duced PPAs in 1989, but the original guidance to prospective purchasers was
vague. See id. at 455. Because the criteria for PPAs was vague, prospective purchas-
ers were reluctant to enter into agreements with the EPA, as evidenced by the fact
that only 14 PPAs were entered into between 1989 and 1995. See id. The EPA
intended the 1995 guidance to "supersede and broaden" the 1989 guidance and
because of its increased specificity, many commentators believe more agreements
will be entered into in the future. See Walsh, supra note 37, at 206 ("[E]xperts have
predicted that the new guidance will produce many more agreements.").
235. See Murphy, supra note 233, at 455 ("A PPA generally requires a pur-
chaser of contaminated property to commit to a specific cleanup as well as make a
payment to EPA in return for a covenant not sue from EPA."); Trigger et al., supra
note 233, at 43 (noting that guidance includes "EPA's provision of a covenant-not-
to-sue to the prospective purchaser if the redevelopment of the land will result in a
'substantial direct benefit' to the EPA... or in a 'substantial indirect benefit' to
the community and some 'lesser direct benefit' to the EPA"). PPAs also provide
protection from suit by other federal agencies under different environmental laws,
by the United States and by third parties in the form of contribution protection for
subsequent claims. See Murphy, supra note 233, at 456. In addition, "[1]iability
protection would extend to subsequent transferees of the property." Walsh, supra
note 37, at 206. Protection from liability to third parties "for claims by adjoining
property owners for loss of property value, stigma damages, or personal injury,"
however, is not dealt with in current PPAs. Wells, supra note 233, at 77. In return
for the release from liability, the prospective purchaser is required to provide a
benefit, either to the EPA or to the community in which the site is located. See
Scott H. Reisch, Reaping "Green" Harvests from "Brownfields": Avoiding Lender Liability
at Contaminated Sites: Part I, CoLO. LAw., Jan. 1997, at 3, 6. The "public benefit"
can be either direct or indirect. Id. Direct benefits include giving the EPA "funds
for or in kind assistance with the cleanup." Id. Indirect benefits are those benefit-
ting the community where the facility is located, including "cleanup, creation of
jobs, and redevelopment of abandoned areas." Id. Finally, a purchaser can pro-
vide a combination of direct and indirect benefits. See id.
236. Cf Walsh, supra note 37, at 206 (discussing liability protection offered to
prospective investors in brownfields). PPAs do not have the force of a statutory
amendment to CERCLA's liability provisions, however, they are an important step
[Vol. 43: p. 219
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Private sector investment in cleanups requires sufficient capital to re-
mediate contaminated sites, which frequently requires outside financ-
ing.2 3 7 Prior to 1996, however, lending institutions were 'justifiably
reluctant" to loan funds for projects that could potentially expose them to
environmental liability. 23 8 In 1996, however, Congress enacted the Asset
towards protecting and thereby encouraging investors to participate in the
remediation of contaminated property. See Trigger et al., supra note 233, at 43
(recognizing PPAs are one EPA action to "clarify and diminish liability concerns"
in investment in contaminated property); see also Murphy, supra note 233, at 456
(stating that lenders, key players in redevelopment, are protected from liability
when borrower has PPA). If, as the Sixth Circuit asserts, the threat of unlimited
CERCLA liability will hinder private sector investment in contaminated properties,
then agreements precluding that liability will remedy the situation and investment
will not be deterred. Compare United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572,
580 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (stating direct liability standard for parent corporations
will deter investment in cleanup of contaminated properties), cert. granted, 118 S.
Ct. 621 (1997), with Steve Taylor, New Environmental Bonanza... Brownfields Means
Greenbacks for Leading Environmental Practices, Or COUNS., May 20, 1996, at 4, 4 (not-
ing that as new laws "have exempted or shifted liability from potential buyers....
'brownfields' are beginning to attract investors").
237. See Murphy, supra note 233, at 465 (noting that many developers lack
sufficient funds to remediate brownfields and must, therefore, secure outside
financing).
238. See Scott H. Reisch, Reaping "Green" Harvests From "Brownfields ": Avoiding
Lender Liability at Contaminated Sites: Part II, COLO. LAw., Feb. 1997, at 9, 9-10 (ex-
plaining how lending practices of past should change); see also H. Edward Abelson,
Environmental Risks for Lenders, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING 1997, at 545,
549 (PLI Real Est. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. N4-4603, 1997)
("The most significant potential risk faced by lenders with respect to... hazardous
material issues is the possibility that the lender becomes directly responsible for
site assessment and cleanup costs associated with a particular property."); Murphy,
supra note 233, at 441 (asserting key barrier to brownfields development is banks'
reluctance to loan money because of potential lender liability); cf Charles F. Let-
tow & Joyce E. McCarty, New Law Protects Banks from Pollution Cleanup Liability,
BANKING POL'Y REP., Mar. 3, 1997, at 1, 12-13 (noting that "[a]fter living in fear for
years about the potential for being held unfairly liable for millions of dollars in
cleanup costs for environmental pollution caused by others, bankers should be
drawing a collective sigh of relief" because of new lender liability law). Section
9601(20) (a) of CERCLA exempts from liability a "person, who, without participat-
ing in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (1994). Initially, courts in-
terpreted this definition to exclude lenders from CERCLA liability unless they
were involved in the day-to-day operations of the facility or environmental decision
making. See Abelson, supra, at 561 (noting Fleet Factors court went "significantly
beyond the previous district court decisions in this area"). The Eleventh Circuit,
however, held that "a lender's mere power to affect and influence a borrower's
operations might be sufficient to lead to liability on the part of the lender" in
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). Lettow & Mc-
Carty, supra, at 13. As a result of this decision, many lenders simply refused to lend
on contaminated property. See Abelson, supra, at 562. Following Fleet Factors, the
EPA issued a rule interpreting the liability exception in CERCLA, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined the EPA did not
possess the power to issue such a rule and vacated it. See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d
1100, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that, in enacting CERCLA, Congress re-
served resolution of liability issues to judiciary). As a result, the EPA promulgated
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Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996 ("the 1996 Lender Liability Act"), 23 9 which prohibits the imposition
of liability on lending institutions, except when the lender exercises perva-
sive control over the contaminated facility.240 Therefore, the act protects
lenders, thereby encouraging them to loan the funds to remediate con-
taminated sites. 241 As a result, sources of sufficient capital are available to
private sector investors, facilitating their participation in cleanups of con-
taminated sites. 24 2 Overall, contrary to the Sixth Circuit's assertion, a rule
imposing direct CERCLA liability on parent operators will not deter pri-
vate sector participation in site remediation. 243 PPAs preclude future
the rule as a nonbinding guidance policy for the government in litigating CERCLA
cases. See Lettow & McCarty, supra, at 14 (recognizing because policy could not
bind states and private litigants, resulting uncertainty and divergence of judicial
thought created "a risky, difficult situation for lenders").
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991b(h), 9601(20), 9607 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
240. See id.; see also Reisch supra note 238, at 10 ("[T]he legislation specifically
prohibits imposition of lender liability based on a lender's mere capacity to influ-
ence, or its unexercised right to control, operations at the contaminated prop-
erty."); Trigger et al., supra note 233, at 44 (noting new law amends CERCLA "to
codify and incorporate the provisions of the EPA's lender rule"). Under the stat-
ute, a lender could lose its liability exemption by either:
(1) "exercis[ing] decision-making control over environmental compli-
ance at the facility such that it has undertaken responsibility for the haz-
ardous substance handling or disposal practices" or (2) "exercis[ing]
management responsibilities at a level comparable to the facility's man-
ager over day-to-day environmental compliance or all of the operational
functions of the facility other than environmental compliance."
Id. (alterations in original). Courts interpreting the law have held that it "'effec-
tively codifies the EPA rule.'" Lettow & McCarty, supra note 238, at 16 (quoting
Kelley v. Tiscornia, No. 94-1403, 1996 WL 732323 at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996)).
241. See Lettow & McCarty, supra note 238, at 13 ("[T]he new law substantially
reduces the risk of potential liability to lenders, and thus it should make credit
more available, particularly for small businesses."). Specifically, the statute pro-
tects lenders in three ways. First, it establishes "safe-harbors" for lenders by al-
lowing them to condition the loan on environmental compliance, to require a
borrower to cleanup the contaminated property, to advise the borrower to lessen
any diminution in property value and to conduct a cleanup itself. See Reisch, supra
note 238, at 9-10. Second, the statute also "allows a lender to foreclose on contami-
nated property and proceed to liquidate assets, maintain business activities, or
wind-up operations without incurring CERCLA liability." Id. at 10. Third, follow-
ing foreclosure, a lender "may act to preserve the value of the property while it is
trying to sell it," including taking limited cleanup actions. Id.
242. See Abelson, supra note 238, at 567-68 (noting that lender liability statute
provides certainty regarding CERCLA liability, which reduces risk associated with
such loans). Lenders are more comfortable with lending to remediate contami-
nated sites because the statute reduces the risks associated with the lending. See id.
at 568. As a result, their ability to successfully make these loans has also increased.
Lettow & McCarty, supra note 238, at 13. In addition, as more customers of lend-
ers look to utilize brownfields, lenders, in order to stay competitive, are "forced...
to more carefully evaluate these projects." Abelson, supra note 238, at 585. This
has resulted in brownfields lending becoming "more of a mainstream activity." Id.
243. See $14-Million Settlement Reached in Pennsylvania, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.,
Apr. 11, 1996, at 1 (discussing settlement in recent CERCLA litigation involving
brownfields site with PPA). The EPA settled CERCLA litigation concerning the
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CERCLA liability for investors in contaminated property and these inves-
tors will have a source of sufficient capital to remediate the sites as a result
of the 1996 Lender Liability Act.
244
E. Direct Parent Liability Standard Results in a Relatively Uniform
Application of the Law
The Sixth Circuit also rejected direct parent liability because it found
the district court's test to be "nebulous," as opposed to the bright line rule
of piercing the corporate veil. 245 The court doubted other courts' ability
to determine "[w] hen, precisely .... a parent [is] acting in a manner con-
sistent with its investment relationship as opposed to a manner that trig-
gers operator liability."246 An examination of cases from circuits that have
adopted the actual control direct liability standard, however, reveals that
like piercing the corporate veil tests, courts apply certain factors to varying
degrees, making the result no more or less uncertain than in piercing the
corporate veil cases. 247 Generally, under the actual control test, operator
liability is appropriate when the parent exercises "active involvement in
cleanup of a Superfund site in Philadelphia. See id. At the time of the settlement,
the EPA and Delaware Avenue Enterprises, an unrelated party to the litigation,
entered into a PPA with the EPA. See id. Under the agreement, Delaware Avenue
Enterprises and two affiliates will pay the EPA and the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania $2.3 million and cooperate in future cleanup efforts. See id. In return, the
EPA agreed not to impose liability on the purchasers for any past contamination.
See id. This example of a PPA is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the parties
entered into the PPA in 1994 under the 1989 EPA guidelines, which were consid-
ered vague and unreliable in the liability protection offered. See id. Second, Dela-
ware Avenue Enterprises, through its affiliates, invested in the remediation of a site
within a jurisdiction that adheres to the actual control standard for parent corpo-
ration liability. See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d
1209, 1222 (3d Cir. 1993) (adopting actual control standard for parent corpora-
tion operator liability). This example stands in direct opposition to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's assertion that the imposition of direct liability will deter private sector
investment in cleanups and also stands as an example of how a PPA encourages
such investment. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th
Cir.) (en banc) (finding threat of liability will deter investment), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 621 (1997).
244. See Murphy, supra note 233, at 455 (noting that in return for commit-
ment of direct or indirect benefit to EPA, prospective purchasers receive covenant
not to sue from EPA); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991b(h), 9601(20), 9607 (1994 &
Supp. 1997) (prohibiting imposition of liability on lenders who loan money to
remediate contaminated facilities).
245. See Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 580 (explaining why district court's ex-
pansive approach to CERCLA remedies presents problems).
246. Id.
247. SeeJohn S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 408 (1st Cir. 1993)
(considering financial and managerial factors in determining whether to hold par-
ent directly liable); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir.
1990) (finding parent exercised financial, managerial and environmental control
over subsidiary); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (assessing whether parent's control over environmental, financial
and managerial decisions was sufficient to impose liability).
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the activities of the subsidiary." 248 The factors applied by courts ultimately
consider whether the parent exerted a sufficient degree of control to be
actively involved and therefore liable.2 4 9
In Kayser-Roth, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition
of operator liability on the defendant parent corporation under the actual
control standard.2 50 The First Circuit found that the parent corporation
exerted "pervasive control" over its subsidiary through (1) total monetary
control, including restricting the subsidiary's budget, collecting its ac-
counts payable and requiring approval for capital expenditures greater
than $5000; (2) control over its board of directors, in that parent corpora-
tion personnel occupied nearly all of the subsidiary's officer and director
positions; (3) a directive that all subsidiary-governmental contact go di-
rectly through the parent; and (4) control over environmental matters,
including the power to prevent the release of hazardous materials.2 51
The First Circuit relied on substantially similar factors in John S. Boyd
to justify imposing direct operator liability.252 There the court found that
(1) the parent exercised monetary control over the subsidiary by requiring
approval for all expenditures over $5000 and approving its budget and (2)
the parent exercised almost complete control over its subsidiary's officers
and board of directors. 253
In Rockwell International, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois also relied on similar factors in determining whether to hold a
parent corporation liable as an operator. 254 The court found that (1) the
parent corporation had significant control over its subsidiary's officers and
248. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27.
249. See Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 900 F. Supp.
1427, 1454 (D. Kan. 1995) (resolving whether parent is liable as result of exercis-
ing direct control over operations of subsidiary), afrd in part, rev'd in part, 100 F.3d
792 (10th Cir. 1996); Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 909 F.
Supp. 1241, 1280-81 (N.D. Iowa 1993) (examining evidence to see if parent exer-
cised sufficient control to be held liable); Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F.
Supp. 345, 354 (D.N.J. 1991) (addressing issue of whether parent "exercised con-
trol over or actively participated in the subsidiary's activities"); United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22 (D.R.I. 1989) ("The question becomes
whether... [the parent] exercised control over... [the subsidiary's] management
and operations sufficient to find that ... [the parent] was a de facto operator."),
affd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
250. See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 28.
251. See id. at 27. The court concluded that "[s]uch control is more than
sufficient to be liable as an operator under CERCLA." Id. at 28.
252. See John S. Boyd, 992 F.2d at 408 (holding parent corporation liable as
operator under actual control standard).
253. See id. The John S. Boyd court found that the parent exercised complete
control over its subsidiary's officers and directors because the president of the sub-
sidiary was also the president of a division of the parent corporation, the parent
corporation appointed the president, the president reported directly to the parent
corporation's officials and the parent corporation selected the subsidiary's direc-
tors. See id.
254. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1391 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (finding genuine issue of material fact to exist as to whether parent cor-
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directors, including hiring or approving the hiring of officers, overlapping
of officers between the parent and subsidiary and determining the respon-
sibilities of the subsidiary's officers; (2) the parent corporation made pub-
lic announcements that it operated the facility; and (3) the parent
corporation exercised control over environmental decisions, including
suggesting changes in hazardous substance disposal protocol. 255
Four factors for determining whether to hold a parent corporation
liable under the actual control standard can be derived from these three
cases.25 6 First, courts consider whether the parent corporation exercises
monetary control over its subsidiary. 257 Second, the nature of the subsidi-
ary's board of directors is relevant to the actual control determination,
specifically the composition of the board, who appointed its members and
to whom the members answer.25 8 Third, the public statements and deal-
ings of the companies are also a factor.259 Fourth, courts consider
poration was operator of facility and denying parent's motion for summary
judgment).
255. See id. at 1390-91. The court stated:
We view the following evidence as demonstrating sufficient participation
in the management of and indicia of the actual exercise of control over
the operations of the Facility to warrant a finding that... [the parent]
was an operator of the Facility within the meaning of § 9607 (a) (2) and
therefore subject to liability as a responsible party.
Id.
256. See John S. Boyd, 992 F.2d at 408 (holding parent corporation liable be-
cause it had control over subsidiary's finances and management); Kayser-Roth, 910
F.2d at 27-28 (finding parent liable because it exercised control over subsidiary's
finances, management, public image and environmental decisions); Rockwell Inter-
national, 702 F. Supp. at 1390-91 (imposing liability on parent corporation because
it controlled subsidiary's management, public image and environmental
decisions).
257. See John S. Boyd, 992 F.2d at 408 (including fact that subsidiary needed
approval for large expenditures as evidence of actual control by parent); Kayser-
Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (including "total monetary control" by parent over subsidiary
as indicia of actual control).
258. See John S. Boyd, 992 F.2d at 408 (relying on fact that parent maintained
presence among officers and directors of subsidiary, that president of subsidiary
was also president of parent division, that president was appointed by chairman of
parent and reported to parent's directors and that parent selected directors for
subsidiary in holding parent liable as operator); Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (noting
placement of parent personnel in subsidiary director and officer positions serves
"'as a means of totally ensuring that... [the parent's] corporate policy was exactly
implemented and precisely carried out"' (quoting United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.R.I. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990)));
Rockwell International, 702 F. Supp. at 1390-91 (discussing evidence that parent cor-
poration controlled hiring practices for subsidiary's officers, that some parent of-
ficers were subsidiary officers and that parent controlled responsibilities of those
officers).
259. See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (finding evidence of actual control in fact
that all subsidiary-governmental contact, including environmental matters, goes di-
rectly through parent); Rockwell International, 702 F. Supp. at 1391 (including par-
ent's statements in public announcements that it operated contaminated facility as
evidence of actual control).
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whether the parent had control over the subsidiary's environmental
decisions.260
Therefore, courts apply the same general factors in assessing parent
corporation liability, indicating the standard is not as nebulous as the
Sixth Circuit suggests. 26 1 Rather, the actual control test is a fact-specific
inquiry applying the several factors to a given case to determine whether
the imposition of liability is appropriate. 26 2 In practice, piercing the cor-
porate veil tests are very similar to the actual control test in that courts
conduct a fact-intensive analysis of a number of factors to determine
whether to pierce the corporate veil. 263 In comparison, the actual control
standard is no more and no less predictable than the Sixth Circuit's pierc-
ing the corporate veil standard. 264
260. See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (including fact that parent controlled envi-
ronmental decisions as factor in upholding liability); Rockwell Internationa 702 F.
Supp. at 1391 (considering fact that parent corporation officials suggested changes
in hazardous substance disposal procedures and reviewed requests to purchase en-
vironmental protection equipment evidence of actual control). The Kayser-Roth
court noted, however, that
[a]lthough indicia of ability to control decisions about hazardous waste
are indicative of the type of control necessary to hold a parent corpora-
tion liable as an operator, we do not think the presence of such indicia is
essential, assuming there are other indicia of the pervasive control neces-
sary to prove operator status.
Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 n.8.
261. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir.) (en
banc) (characterizing district court's actual control test as nebulous as opposed to
bright-line doctrine of piercing corporate veil), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997).
262. See Steams & Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp.
790, 803 (D.N.J. 1996) ("The 'actual control' determination 'requires an inher-
ently fact-intensive inquiry, involving consideration of the totality of the circum-
stances presented.'" (quoting Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli
Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1222 (3d Cir. 1993))); Fishbein Family Partnership v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 764, 771 (D.N.J. 1994) ("'A fact specific inquiry is re-
quired to determine whether a corporation exerts enough control over another to
be given operator status under CERCLA.'" (quoting John S. Boyd, 992 F.2d at
408)). The factors courts rely on have varying importance, depending on the facts
of the given case. See Vineland Constr. Co. v. Universal-Rundle Corp., No.
CIV.A.92-3115, 1994 WL 912254, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1994) (noting that "no one
factor is dispositive, and each is important only to the extent it is evidence of sub-
stantial, actual control").
263. See Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644,
656 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (stating that piercing corporate veil analysis begins with fact
specific "examination of factors" evidencing how subsidiary corporation operates
and parent's relationship to that operation); Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 23-24 (an-
alyzing factors relevant to piercing parent corporation's veil in light of specific
facts in case).
264. Compare John S. Boyd, 992 F.2d at 408 (applying actual control factors to
fact-specific inquiry to determine whether imposition of operator liability was ap-
propriate), with Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 23 (applying piercing corporate veil
factors to fact-specific inquiry to determine whether imposition of owner liability is
appropriate).
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V. CONCLUSION & IMPACT
Overall, the Sixth Circuit erred in adopting a piercing the corporate
veil standard for operator liability. The court based its holding on a misin-
terpretation of the plain language and congressional goals of the statute,
as well as minimally supported policy justifications. Despite the inherent
flaws in the court's opinion, however, the Cordova Chemical standard, as the
controlling precedent, will determine parent corporation operator liability
in the Sixth Circuit. Under the Cordova Chemical piercing the corporate
veil standard, a court is less likely to impose operator liability on a parent
corporation.2 65 As a result, this decision may persuade corporations to
incorporate subsidiaries that deal with hazardous substances in states
within the Sixth Circuit, thereby decreasing the possibility of parent corpo-
ration operator liability.
Within the Sixth Circuit, one court has held that the Cordova Chemical
decision also impacts other areas of CERCLA liability. 266 The United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan extended the
application of the Cordova Chemical standard to arranger liability.2 67 The
court held that imposing liability based on piercing the corporate veil "has
equal, if not stronger, application to [Superfund] arranger liability." 268
Outside of the Sixth Circuit, this decision is not likely to have a signifi-
cant impact. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
already addressed the issue of what standard should apply for adjudging
parent corporation liability. 269 In addition, when the remaining circuits
265. Compare Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 580 (requiring "patent abuse of the
corporate form" and "fraud" to pierce corporate veil), with Schiavone v. Pearce, 79
F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring substantial control over subsidiary for di-
rect liability). To pierce, "[t]here must be such a unity of interest and ownership
that the separate personalities of the corporation and its owner cease to exist, and
the circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate
existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice." Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d
at 580. Imposing operator liability under the actual control standard, however,
requires only "substantial control exercised by one corporation over the activities
of the other." Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221.
266. See United States v. CPC Int'l, Inc., No. 96-680, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14154, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 1997) (applying Cordova Chemical operator stan-
dard to adjudge parent corporation's arranger liability).
267. See id. (refusing to hold parent corporation liable as arranger because
veil piercing was not warranted).
268. CPC International 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14154, at *3.
269. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d
586, 590 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating liability standard that court would apply as "if
the evidence indicates [parent corporation] had 'substantial control' over the facil-
ity"), opinion modified, 95 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1996); Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 255 (ap-
plying direct liability, actual control standard to determine parent corporation
operator liability); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 808-09 (8th
Cir. 1995) (adopting "actual control" liability standard for adjudging United
States' operator liability, which court equates with corporate liability); Sidney S.
Arst v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
president and vice-president of corporation liable as operators under actual con-
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address this issue, it is not likely that they will follow the Sixth Circuit for
two reasons. First, the Sixth Circuit is in the distinct minority.2 70 Second,
the Cordova Chemical decision is based on an incorrect interpretation of
CERCLA and it hinders Congress' goals in enacting the statute. Until the
Supreme Court decides what standard courts should apply in determining
parent corporation liability, courts will continue to disagree as to the ap-
propriate liability standard and a parent corporation's risk of operator lia-
bility will remain jurisdiction specific. 2 71 In the meantime, the actual
control standard most closely resembles CERCLA's statutory language and
its congressional intent.
Amy C. Stovall
trol standard); Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1220-21 (adopting actual control stan-
dard for parent corporation liability); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp.,
996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding parent corporation was not liable as
operator because it did not "exercise[ ] actual and pervasive control of the subsidi-
ary"); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding corporate principles directly liable as operators under authority to con-
trol standard); Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931
F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (considering whether majority shareholder was oper-
ator under actual participation in wrongful conduct standard); Kayser-Roth, 910
F.2d at 27 (holding parent corporation liable as operator under "active involve-
ment in the activities of the subsidiary" standard).
270. SeeJoslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L.James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83-84 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that parent corporation can be liable only if piercing corporate veil is
warranted). The Fifth Circuit is the only other court to adopt a piercing the cor-
porate veil standard for parent corporation operator liability. See id. at 82-83 (rec-
ognizing that other circuits apply direct liability standard). A year after Joslyn
Manufacturing, however, the Fifth Circuit applied the actual control standard in
determining whether to hold a majority shareholder liable. See Riverside, 931 F.2d
at 330 (deciding issue of owner and operator liability under CERCLA without ref-
erence to Joslyn Manufacturing).
271. See Chandler & Grosser, supra note 3, at 25 (urging Supreme Court to
grant certiorari and establish "a uniform rule of law" for parent corporation opera-
tor liability).
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